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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Kyle Douglas Wilson
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
September 2019
Title: Essays in Environmental Economics
This dissertation focuses on two aspects of Environmental Economics that
are critical in cost-beneﬁt analysis. Chapters II and III focus on estimating
potential costs of drought that may be exacerbated by climate change, and
Chapter IV focuses on examining the hedonic property value model that is
commonly used to estimate potential beneﬁts of environmental regulation. In
Chapter II I estimate the impact of drought on crime in South Africa. Using
a police-station by year panel, I exploit variation in the timing of droughts
and water management policies to explain changes in crime. I ﬁnd that violent
crimes increase by 10%, police-detected crimes fall by 20%, and that there is no
discernible impact on sex crimes or property crimes. These ﬁndings suggest that
in the future, especially as severe droughts become more prevalent due to climate
change, crime prevention may be an important component of climate policy. In
Chapter III I examine how exposure to drought aﬀects migration in the United
iv
States using a dataset of bilateral migration ﬂows from 20002013. I ﬁnd that
moderate and severe drought do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence migration, but that
exceptional drought and multi-year severe droughts reduce out-migration from
aicted counties. I further ﬁnd that this result is strongest in low-income and
high-poverty counties. These results suggest that adaptation to climate change
through migration may be limited for disadvantaged groups in the United States.
In Chapter IV I examine how the presence of a bubble in the housing markets
aﬀects estimates in a hedonic propery value model. The results indicate that the
bubble does cause bias in the naive estimates, and that the extent of the bias
increases with the size of the bubble.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The essays in this dissertation cover two broad topics. The ﬁrst is the social
eﬀects of drought and water shortages. In this dissertation I explore two possible
eﬀects; increases in crime in the ﬁrst substantive chapter and changes in migration
in the second substantive chapter. The third substantive chapter explores the
hedonic property value model, used to estimate the value of environmental
amenities, and examines whether a bubble in the housing market could bias
estimates recovered from this model.
The ﬁrst substantive chapter uses station-level data from the South African
Police Department in combination with precipitation data to create a station-year
panel dataset. The crime data consist of annual counts of seventeen distinct types
of community-reported crimes and three types of police-detected crimes. The
precipitation data are measured monthly on a 0.5×0.5 lat/long grid. I aggregate
the precipitation data to the police-station level by matching the four nearest grid
points to the centroid of the police jurisdiction, and weighting the value by the
inverse distance to the station.
I also use demographic data from the South African Census. These data are
matched to the station jurisdiction boundaries using areal interpolation. I assume
that the population of each census ward is distributed evenly over the area of the
ward, and then calculate the area of the ward that belongs to each police station's
jurisdiction. I then assign the population proportionally to this area.
I model the numbers of crimes at each station using a negative binomial
regression with ﬁxed eﬀects at the station level as well as year ﬁxed eﬀects. I
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ﬁrst estimate the impact of drought on crime in general. With less precipitation,
I ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant increase in violent crimes, sex crimes, robberies, and
police-detected crimes, but do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant change in property
crimes.
I then test whether there is an additional eﬀect of an indicator for severe
drought beyond just the linear relationship with precipitation in general. Under
severe drought conditions, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in violent crimes and
robberies and signiﬁcant decreases in police-detected crimes. I do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence for sex crimes or property crimes.
Additionally, I examine whether the imposition of exceptionally stringent
urban water-use rationing aﬀects crime. I use an indicator variable for those
jurisdictions in the greater Cape Town metropolitan area which were subject to
stringent regulations on water use in 2018. While controlling for the general eﬀects
of drought, I ﬁnd that these regulations increase both violent crimes and robberies,
and reduce the detection of other crimes normally discovered by police.
I then explore whether these increases in crime are speciﬁc to certain types
of locations. Using the demographic variables from the census, I ﬁnd that the
increases in crime are strongest in more auent areas and in areas where a higher
proportion of the population is white.
Collectively, these results suggest that drought and dry conditions lead to
increases in some types of crimes, and that these increases can be exacerbated by
severe drought and when stringent water rationing may be necessary to preserve
the remaining water supply.
The second substantive chapter of this dissertation looks at the eﬀects of
drought on migration in the United States. This project uses data derived from
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20002013 tax returns to obtain measures of county-to-county migration in the
United States. I combine these migration data with measures of drought exposure
at the county level from the United States Drought Monitor to estimate the eﬀects
of drought on migration.
I model the log of the number of migrations between each county pair using
a ﬁxed eﬀects model to control for the factors that determine the number of
migrations between each origin and destination county pair. I ﬁnd that moderate
and severe drought have little impact on migration in the U.S. However, I ﬁnd
that extreme drought in the origin county leads to a reduction in out-migration,
suggesting that individuals in drought locations may be stuck in liquidity traps
that reduce the number of migrations.
I then estimate the model using indicator variables for origin counties that
are experiencing multi-year drought events. Counties whose populations are
exposed to moderate through extreme drought for three or more years experience a
reduction in out-migration of 2-3%. I further explore this result by subsampling
based on demographic variables in the origin-county. I ﬁnd that counties with
higher poverty rates and lower median incomes see a stronger eﬀect, but that
counties with larger proportions of hispanic, black, or working age population do
not. I also ﬁnd that counties that are less urban or have a higher percentage of
farms do not.
The third substantive chapter explores a diﬀerent side of the environmental
economics literature, the hedonic property value model. This model is widely
used to estimate the value of environmental amenities such as clean air, as well
as other public goods such as school quality. This chapter studies the potentially
confounding eﬀects of a bubble in the housing market. In general, bubbles cause
3
housing prices to become artiﬁcially high, and this may cause the measured
implicit price of an environmental amenity to be unreliable.
For this chapter, I use a Monte Carlo simulation to mimic a housing market
under the presence of a housing bubble. Using simulation techniques allows me
to have full information about the fundamental price of the house as well as
the mark-up that is due to the presence of the bubble. Observational data do
not allow for the separate, direct measurement of these two components. After
simulation of a market equilibrium, I recover estimates of the marginal price of an
environmental amenity and I ﬁnd that the bubble does bias the estimates of the
marginal price for that amenity, and that the size of this bias depends on the size
of the bubble.
4
CHAPTER II
THE IMPACT OF DROUGHT ON CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA
Introduction
Water is critical input to agriculture and industry as well as being a daily
requirement for human life. Severe drought can reduce the available supply of
water and induce competition for access to it. Competition for an essential but
scarce resource can create conﬂict.
There is burgeoning evidence that drought and climate shocks may lead to
conﬂict or violence, in low-income countries in particular. There is also evidence
that heat and drought lead to increases in crime in high-income countries. It
is unknown what impacts drought and climate change have in middle-income
countries. The recent and severe South African drought provides a unique
opportunity to study the eﬀects of drought in a middle-income country. This
uniqueness comes from the fact that while South Africa is a middle-income
country, it has the highest inequality in the world.1 Thus, South Africa provides
a setting where we can study drought's eﬀects for impoverished people and for
their auent neighbors.
In this paper, I study the impacts on crime of drought, water scarcity,
and urban water-use rationing. I use crime data from the South African Police
Service, drought data from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and
demographic data from StatsSA. I combine these three data sources to create a
dataset on crime and drought conditions at the police-station level.
1http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSF
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I use a negative binomial model to show that a one standard-deviation
reduction in precipitation results in a 1.4-2.7% increase in reports of violent crimes,
sex crimes, robberies, and police-detected crimes, but does not cause a statistically
signiﬁcant change in property crimes. Severe drought causes a 3% additional
increase in violent crimes, and a 14% reduction in police-detected crimes. Next,
I estimate the eﬀects of the strict water rationing implemented in 2018 in the
greater Cape Town metropolitan area. This rationing is associated with a 4%
increase in violent crime, an 8% increase in robberies and a 20% reduction in
police-detected crimes. Increases in crime are largest in areas that have high
average income, and have a higher proportion of white population.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation for the changes in crime suggest that the
rationing resulted in an addition 335 murders, 502 car and 85 truck hijackings, 475
robberies at residence, as well as 4470 additional DUIs that went undetected.
Overall, the evidence points to a pattern in which drought aﬀects violent
types of crime, but does not aﬀect non-violent property crimes. This is in line with
a number of papers that have linked drought to conﬂict in developing countries
(Reuveny, 2007; Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2011; Fjelde and von Uexkull,
2012; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Scheﬀran et al., 2012; Hodler and Raschky,
2014; Aidt and Leon, 2016; Almer et al., 2017), however, this is in stark contrast
to evidence from the United States, where drought has been found to increase
property crimes but not violent crimes (Goin et al., 2017).
These results will help policy-makers understand the full consequences
of drought. As climate change progresses, drought is expected to become more
prevalent, and to aﬀect areas that have not previously been vulnerable. This paper
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suggests that it is important to allocate government and police resources during a
drought to prevent crime escalation.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on the link
between drought and crime, and explains the South African context. Section 3
describes the data sources and outlines the model used to estimate the impact
of drought on crime. Section 4 describes the results and a discussion of their
implications. Section 5 concludes.
Background
Droughts, Crime, and Conﬂict
Droughts have a multifaceted eﬀect on the natural environment and
human welfare. Droughts directly reduce crop yields, accelerate forest loss,
damage habitats for ﬁsh and wildlife, and harm livestock. These consequences
can, indirectly, lead to reduced income for farmers, unemployment, increased
crime, civil unrest to the point of war, and migration. These indirect losses can
sometimes exceed the direct losses (Wilhite et al., 2007).
There is still a need for further study to determine the true extent of the
potential social damages from climate shocks. This is particularly urgent in
low income countries, which will be the most vulnerable to water shortages and
droughts (Gleick and Heberger, 2014).
Drought has been linked to harmful eﬀects on health, both directly through
water scarcity, as well as through the income shocks in agricultural communities as
explored by Burgess and Deschenes (2011); Kudamatsu et al. (2012); Burke et al.
(2009); Dinkelman (2017). In other work, Raddatz (2009), Schlenker and Lobell
(2010), Loayza et al. (2012), and Fomby et al. (2013) show that drought reduces
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long-run economic growth. Several papers also ﬁnd signiﬁcant short-run eﬀects of
drought. Both Fafchamps et al. (1998) and Kazianga and Udry (2006) show that
rural Africans experience signiﬁcant income losses, and Dell et al. (2014) ﬁnd that
livestock holdings do not provide rural Africans with suﬃcient insurance against
drought-related losses.
Recently, several studies have demonstrated that drought, heat, and climate
change are linked to conﬂict, rioting, and civil war (Reuveny, 2007; Burke et al.,
2009; Hsiang et al., 2011; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix and Salehyan,
2012; Scheﬀran et al., 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Aidt and Leon, 2016;
Almer et al., 2017). Miguel et al. (2004) link drought-induced income shocks to
an increased risk of civil war in Africa. Some studies argue the association is not
causal, and that climate and climate shocks are not the true cause of the conﬂicts
(Buhaug, 2010; Ciccone, 2011). Salehyan (2014) reviews the competing viewpoints
in this literature.
In developed countries, where institutions are stronger, conﬂict and rioting
are less likely. However, competition for scarce water may drive increases in crime
Butler and Keﬀord (2018). Becker (1968)'s rational crime framework suggests that
droughts could increase crime via several mechanisms. Unemployment and income
losses in the agricultural sector may reduce the opportunity cost of committing
crimes. Severe resource scarcity may reduce the societal stigma associated with
committing a crime. 2 Social conﬂict over reduced access to common-property
resources, in general, may contribute to criminal behavior, a relationship explored
2With the drought in Cape Town, South Africa, for example, there is evidence
that resentment against wealthy households has escalated because these households
can aﬀord to drill private wells to bypass regulations on water consumption.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/02/23/feature/as-cape-towns-water-
runs-out-the-rich-drill-wells-the-poor-worry-about-eating/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fe75d80349c5
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by Barnett and Adger (2007) and Agnew (2012). Under-priced urban water
supplies may be one example of such a resource.
Crime will also increase if the risk of punishment is reduced during drought
confditions. For instance, police personnel preoccupied with the enforcement of
water rights, may be less likely to investigate and prosecute other types of crimes.
Victims are less likely to report a crime if they believe the police will not devote
resources to solving the crime. During a time of social conﬂict, perpetrators may
believe that the risk of being caught and punished is lessened.
To date, however, there have been few studies that attempt to examine the
speciﬁc research question posed in this paperwhether drought aﬀects crime.
Goin et al. (2017) consider the drought that aﬀected California during 20112015.
Using a synthetic control strategy, they estimate that property crimes increased
approximately 9% but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on violent crimes.
There is also a broad literature on how heat and weather aﬀect crime (Lab
and Hirschel, 1988; Field, 1992; Anderson, 2001; Simister and Cooper, 2005;
Talaei et al., 2008; Butke and Sheridan, 2010; Horrocks and Menclova, 2011; Sorg
and Taylor, 2011; Mares, 2013a,b; Ranson, 2014). The focus of these papers is
mostly on short-term variation in weather or temperature, and they ﬁnd that the
number of crimes committed tends to increase when the weather is hot and when
precipitation is low.
The 20152018 South African Drought
Cape Town, South Africa, began experiencing an increasingly severe drought
in 2015. The initial drought in 2015 and 2016 aﬀected most of the country, as
can be seen in the maps of Figure 1. By 2017, the rest of the country returned
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to normal levels of rainfall, while Cape Town continued to experience meager levels
of rainfall. The Western Cape Province that surrounds Cape Town constitutes
a distinct climate zone. The majority of the country receives major rainfall
during the summer months of the Southern Hemisphere (DecemberMarch) due
to weather patterns that bring moisture south from the center of the continent.
The Western Cape receives rainfall primarily during the winter months (June
September) with moisture that blows inland from the southwestern ocean. This
meteorological diﬀerence has caused the drought experienced in the Western Cape
to be both more sustained, and also more severe, while leaving the rest of the
country relatively insulated from its eﬀects.
The greater Cape Town area draws its water from reservoirs created by
six major dams. The time-series plot in Figure 2 shows the amount of water in
storage. For the years 20082015, Cape Town used approximately 35% of the
total dam capacity per year during the dry season, and this draw-down has been
replenished in most years during the following rainy season. During the ﬁrst year
of the drought in 2015, Cape Town used extra water (slightly more than 50% of
the capacity of these six reservoirs) to respond to the drought. Area farms had
received low rainfall, so the local government supplied them with supplemental
irrigation water from these reservoirs. When rain was again low in 2016, reservoir
usage was similarly high. When rainfall in 2017 had still not returned to normal,
the city began to ration the water to farmers and to implement urban water-use
regulations. The rainy season of 2017 was historically low. With reservoirs holding
water at only 25% of their capacity at the beginning of the dry season, and that
strict regulations would be necessary to ensure that the reservoirs did not run dry.
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FIGURE 1.
Drought Severity over Time
(a) 2010 (b) 2014
(c) 2016 (d) 2018
When the drought continued, extreme measures were necessary to ensure
subsistence levels of public water provision. In early 2018, city and provincial
11
FIGURE 2.
Water Level of Major Reservoirs in the Western Cape
authorities began seriously discussing Day Zero, when water supplies would
be shut oﬀ to individual homes and businesses. Water would be available only
at centralized and closely monitored public distribution points. Residents would
have no water piped into their homes, and would receive an allowance of just 6.25
gallons per person per day available only at those centralized locations across the
city that would be monitored by police. Day Zero was initially forecasted for 16
April, 2018.
The regulations and the impending threat of Day Zero in early 2018 reduced
water consumption in Cape Town enough to prevent the shut oﬀ of water. Had
the water in Cape Town been shut oﬀ, it would have marked the ﬁrst time in any
major city in modern times that public piped water supplies would be suspended.
The appendix to this paper includes full details on the dates and details of
the regulations implemented in Cape Town. The strictest regulations and the date
of the Day Zero announcement correspond to year 2018 in the data set (Apr2017
Mar2018). The regulations in place during year 2017 (Apr2016Mar2017) are
comparable to the strictest constraints that have been imposed in the United
12
States in recent history, i.e. the 20112015 drought in California and the 2010
2011 drought in Texas.
Empirical Model
Data Sources
For the analysis of this paper I put together a database that combines data
on crime in South Africa, precipitation, and other demographic variables at a
disaggregated geographic level.
Disaggregated crime data is provided by the South African Police Service.3
The dataset contains annual counts of the number of crimes in diﬀerent categories
at each police station during 20092018. The South African Police Service releases
these data annually in September or October. For all crimes, the data consist
of the number of reported crimes, rather than the number of crimes actually
committed. It must be acknowledged that there may be some question as to the
reliability of the crime numbers. The Ministry of Police is under a directive to
reduce crime, and there is anecdotal evidence that at least some police stations
under-report minor crimes to comply with crime-reduction expectations. However,
the more serious crimes (such as robbery, assault, murder) are believed to be very
reliable.4 There have been many domestic news stories written about whether
reductions in property crimes nationwide are the result of actual crime reductions,
or merely a consequence of decreased reporting.5 The less-serious crimes in this
3https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php
4https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-crime-statistics-for-2017-18/
5https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-11-are-the-saps-crimestats-accurate/
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dataset therefore should be considered, potentially, to be measured with some error
which will cause downward bias in the estimated impact.
There are 17 speciﬁc types of reported crimes in the dataset categorized as
property crimes, sex crimes, or violent crimes. Property crimes include burglary,
motor vehicle theft, arson and robbery. Sex crimes include rape, attempted rape,
and sexual assault. Violent crimes include murder, attempted murder, and assault.
DUI, possession of illegal ﬁrearms, and drug related crimes are also labeled as
police-detected crimes because these are discovered by police rather than being
reported.
Information on drought conditions comes from the standardized
precipitation-evapotranspiration index (SPEI). SPEI is available for the entire
globe at a 0.5×0.5 degree resolution for each month (Vicente-Serrano et al.,
2010). The time period 19502010 is used to calculate the mean and variance of
rainfall for standardization of each grid point. The index is measured on a scale
of standard deviations. Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010) recommend that an SPEI <-
1.5 be classiﬁed as moderate drought, and an SPEI < -2.0 be classiﬁed as severe
drought. I will adopt the same convention. I calculate the SPEI for each station
as the weighted mean of the surrounding grid points. Figure 3 shows a histogram
of the distribution of SPEI for the full sample, and Figure 4 show a histogram for
individual years of the sample. The mean SPEI for the full sample is -0.6. For
most years, the distribution of SPEI is approximately normal. The year 2016 is the
notable exception, when a large portion of the country suﬀered severe drought.
I obtain control variables from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), the
government oﬃce that conducts the national census. The covariates used in this
analysis include race distributions, mean income per capita, education levels,
14
FIGURE 3.
Histogram of Drought Index for years 2009-2018
mean household size, and the geographic area of each station's jurisdiction.
I also calculate a Gini coeﬃcient to measure inequality and a Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman Index to measure racial concentration across the four main oﬃcial
racial designations in the area: Black, White, Colored, and Indian. Table 1 shows
summary statistics for crime and demographic variables.
The unit of observation for this empirical analysis is the station-year,
because this is the ﬁnest level of detail for the crime data. To use this level of
disaggregation, the other datasets ﬁrst needed to be transformed to this same
spatial and temporal level of aggregation. The available drought data are matched
to the geographic centroid of the station jurisdiction. The demographic data
are distributed across jurisdictions using spatial weights. The appendix includes
speciﬁc details about how each variable has been processed to conform to the same
spatial and temporal extent.
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TABLE 1.
Summary Statistics
(1)
Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
Murder 15.3 23.1 0 308
All Reported Crimes 1580 2061 0 21874
Property Crimes 473 627 0 5097
Police Detected Crimes 270 465 0 7013
Population 47900 48600 349 331050
Average Income 4610 4100 960 29900
% Urban 60.7 37.2 0 100
% White 10.2 14.2 0 74.8
% Black 72.3 31.5 2.41 99.9
Observations 11400
Data is annual police-station level panel data for South Africa.
Crime counts is the total number reported at each
station in a year. Demographic variables for the police
jurisdiction are interpolated from census data.
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FIGURE 4.
Histogram of Drought Index for Individual Years
(a) 2010 (b) 2014
(c) 2016 (d) 2018
Model Speciﬁcation
This paper focuses on estimating the eﬀect of extreme drought on local
crime in South Africa i.e. Crime=f(Drought, Population, Avg Income, Race, ...).
Figure 5 shows a histogram of the marginal distribution of the number of murders
by station. Other crime types also display a similar frequency proﬁle. The variance
of this distribution is larger than the mean, indicating that a Poisson distribution
will not capture the overdispersion. I assume that the numbers of crimes recorded
in year t, for station i, follow a conditional negative binomial distribution. This
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distribution ﬁts the count nature of the data, while generalizing the Poisson
distribution to allow for over-dispersion and cross-sectional heterogeneity (Greene,
2012). Diﬀering exposure for jurisdictions of diﬀerent size is accommodated via
station ﬁxed eﬀects.
FIGURE 5.
Histogram of Murders by Station
I choose a count-data model over the log-linear OLS approach because this
allows me to accommodate both the skewness of the discrete distribution and
the zero values that are prevalent in the data, particularly for some of the more
uncommon crimes.
Regression Equation
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of drought
conditions on local crime levels in South Africa. I use a panel model, with station
and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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The Poisson regression, a special case of the negative binomial models used
here, assumes that:
E[Crimeit] = exp(β1SPEIit + β2Droughtit + γXit + αi + µt) (2.1)
The dependent variable is a count variable for various types of crime collected
annually over each jurisdiction over a ten-year period.6
I use three diﬀerent measures of drought intensity, SPEI, an SPEI-based
indicator for severe drought, and SPEI interacted with local water-use rationing
indicators:
1. The ﬁrst measure is SPEI as a continuous variable. The index is centered
around 0 as an average rainfall year, negative values in the SPEI index
indicate drier conditions. Negative values for the β1 coeﬃcients correspond
to an increase in crime.
2. The second measure is an indicator variable when SPEI is less than -2, i.e
when rainfall and other drought measures are two standard deviations below
the long-run average. This discrete variable will account for any changes that
occur when drought becomes severe. This indicator allows me to control for
discrete non-linear eﬀects that may occur only during extreme drought. The
creators of SPEI recommend -2 as the threshold for severe drought, and I will
follow this convention.7
6The expected number of crimes will also vary systematically with the population
(exposure) of the jurisdiction. The jurisdiction ﬁxed eﬀects will absorb the usual log(popi)
explanatory variable with a coeﬃcient constrained to unity. Changes in population are included
in the Xit to ensure that migration does not bias the estimates.
7The results are robust to the exact deﬁnition of this threshold. For robustness results see the
Appendix.
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3. The ﬁnal drought measure is an indicator whether the station is part of the
speciﬁc geographic area that is aﬀected by the emergency water restrictions
imposed in the greater Cape Town metropolitan area in 2018. This variable
is denoted CapeTown2018
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the locations of areas classiﬁed using the second
and third drought measures. Figure 6 shows the locations for 2011 to show the
distribution for an average year, and also for 2018 when the Western Cape and
other parts of the country are aﬀected by severe drought at a higher rate than
average. Figure 7 shows the locations of the police stations that are classiﬁed
with the CapeTown2018 indicator. Overall, across the ten year sample period,
10.1% of the total precincts are classiﬁed with the Severe Drought Indicator, and
the CapeTown2018 Indicator represents 59% of the precincts classiﬁed as Severe
Drought in 2018.
FIGURE 6.
Histogram of Drought Index for Individual Years
(a) 2011 (b) 2018
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FIGURE 7.
Location of Police Jurisdictions Classiﬁed with CapeTown2018 Indicator
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The term µt represents year ﬁxed eﬀects, and αi represents station ﬁxed
eﬀects. The station-level ﬁxed eﬀects control for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity in crime at each station.8 The time ﬁxed eﬀects ﬂexibly control for
any time trends or cyclical patterns in the data, shared across all jurisdictions.
The Xit variables are a vector of controls. These controls include population
at the Province level (the ﬁnest spatial resolution available) to control for changes
in crime that may be due to migration and temperature variables aggregated to
the annual level.
I estimate equation (1) using maximum likelihood and calculate the standard
errors via bootstrap to account for any potential serial auto-correlation in the
errors (Bertrand et al., 2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
The coeﬃcients of primary interest in equation (1) are β1, which is the eﬀect
of drought on the logarithm of crimes, and β2, which is the change in log(crime)
that occurs discretely when a station is aﬀected by severe drought.
I next consider the eﬀect of the Cape Town water regulations implemented in
2018 on crime:
E[Crimeit] = exp(β1SPEIit+β2Droughtit+β3CapeTown2018it+γXit+αi+µt) (2.2)
Equation (2) extends equation (1) by adding an indicator that equals one
when jurisdictions in the greater Cape Town metropolitan area apply severe water
regulations in 2018. The β3 coeﬃcient in equation (2) can be interpreted as the
impact of the severe water regulations (and the implicitly cumulative eﬀect of
8These ﬁxed eﬀects could be implemented at a more-aggregated level, included at the
Province level, or at the district level. Districts are bureaucratic groups that oversee multiple
police stations, with (on average) about ten stations per district. Table 10 shows how the results
change as the spatial extent of the cross-sectional ﬁxed eﬀects is changed.
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the lengthy drought on crime) compared to other areas that experience a severe
drought (while controlling for the continuous eﬀects of actual water availability
through SPEI).
Results
First consider the eﬀect of drought on general crime. Table 2 contains the
results of estimating equation (1). The negative estimates for the coeﬃcients
of interest indicate that a one-standard-deviation reduction in SPEI (indicating
drier conditions) increases violent crimes, sex crimes, aggravated robbery, and
police-detected crimes by approximately 2%. However, the coeﬃcient on SPEI
for property crimes is statistically insigniﬁcant. Based on the conﬁdence interval
for the estimated coeﬃcient, the change in property crimes for a one-standard-
deviation change in SPEI is unlikely to be larger than 1.5%. Drier conditions
correspond to slightly elevated levels of most crime types but do not change the
levels of property crimes, on average, across police stations.
Figure 8 shows coeﬃcients of a regression with the drought index converted
into indicator variables that equal 1 if the index is within a bin of 0.5 standard
deviations. This regression shows whether there are non-linear eﬀects that are
not being captured in the previous speciﬁcation. The ﬁgure shows that there
are increases in violent crime and robberies, and reductions in police-detected
crimes when drought is severe. The ﬁgure also shows that severe wet weather
may increase crime for all crime types. Across the diﬀerent crime types, the linear
speciﬁcation ﬁts the data well for most of the drought spectrum, and that there
may be nonlinear eﬀects for severe drought.
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FIGURE 8.
Changes in Crime due to Drought: Drought Index as the Key Regressor Converted into
Bins
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
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TABLE 2.
Changes in Crime by Crime Category: Drought Index as the Key Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Violent Crimes
(Excluding Sex Crimes)
Total
Sex Crimes
Total Aggravated
Robbery Crimes
Total
Non-Contact
Property Crimes
Total Crimes
Detected as a
Result of
Police Action
Drought Index 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0140∗∗ 0.0179∗∗ 0.00955 0.0171∗∗
(0.00677) (0.00708) (0.00821) (0.00714) (0.00711)
No. obs. 11400 11390 11310 11400 10260
Log L -54648.13 -37081.55 -42134.06 -56449.14 -45533.23
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Station Station Station Station Station
Errors Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population at the provincial level. Drought Index used is
SPEI, measured as standard deviation from mean precipitation.
Table 3 shows the results for estimating equation (2). The coeﬃcient on the
severe drought indicator variable tells us whether a jurisdiction that experiences
a severe drought has a non-linear change in crime, controlling for the baseline
inﬂuence of the continuous measure of SPEI. The coeﬃcient on the severe drought
indicator in the violent crime regression is statistically signiﬁcant and positive.
The corresponding coeﬃcients in the police-detected crime and property crime
regressions are signiﬁcant and negative, but these coeﬃcients in the sex crimes
and aggravated robbery regressions are not statistically signiﬁcant. These results
indicate that there are discrete increases in violent crime (by about 3%) when
an area faces severe drought but a decrease in reported property crimes (about
2.6%). The negative coeﬃcients on severe drought in the regression to explain
police-detected crimes is larger in absolute magnitude, indicating that police
are detecting approximately 15% fewer crimes in areas that experience a severe
drought. Possible explanations for why this may be the case are considered in the
discussion section to follow.
26
27
TABLE 3.
Changes in Crime by Crime Category: Indicator variable for severe drought when SPEI < −2
in addition to continuous precipitation index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Violent Crimes
(Excluding Sex Crimes)
Total
Sex Crimes
Total Aggravated
Robbery Crimes
Total
Non-Contact
Property Crimes
Total Crimes
Detected as a
Result of
Police Action
Severe Drought 0.0318∗∗ -0.0106 0.0234 -0.0260∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0186) (0.0203) (0.0156) (0.0219)
Drought Index 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0155∗ 0.0141 0.0136∗ 0.0454∗∗∗
(0.00788) (0.00840) (0.00957) (0.00812) (0.00928)
No. obs. 11400 11390 11310 11400 10260
Log L -54645.00 -37081.30 -42132.97 -56446.98 -45489.89
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Station Station Station Station Station
Errors Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population at the provincial level. Drought Index used is
SPEI, measured as standard deviation from mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2
Table 4 shows variation in crime in the Western Cape Province over the
period that had tight water rationingbeyond the drought itselfon crime.
Violent crime, aggravated robbery, and crimes that are detected as a result of
police action are the categories of crime that show a statistically signiﬁcant change
in Cape Town during the period of strict water rationing. The coeﬃcients on
violent crimes and aggravated robbery are positive, indicating that these types
of crimes are increasing. The coeﬃceints on police-detected crimes, are negative,
indicating that these types of crimes are observed less frequently.
Sex crimes and non-contact property crimes are not aﬀected to a statistically
signiﬁcant extent by this rationing. However, it is possible they might experience
a combination of more crime that is oﬀset by a decrease in reporting, to yield no
net eﬀect. Splitting these crimes into their individual crime types also reveals no
signiﬁcant eﬀects, as Table 8 and Table 9 in the appendix show.
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TABLE 4.
Changes in Crime Types by Category: Continuous and Discrete Measures of Drought and Water Regulations in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Violent Crimes
(Excluding Sex Crimes)
Total
Sex Crimes
Total Aggravated
Robbery Crimes
Total
Non-Contact
Property Crimes
Total Crimes
Detected as a
Result of
Police Action
CapeTown2018 0.0420∗ 0.0286 0.0828∗∗ -0.0195 -0.204∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0306) (0.0322) (0.0203) (0.0352)
Severe Drought 0.00835 0.00386 -0.00289 -0.0292∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0151) (0.0117) (0.0216)
Drought Index 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.00877 0.00227 0.0115∗ 0.0542∗∗∗
(0.00661) (0.00644) (0.00954) (0.00652) (0.00748)
No. obs. 10260 10251 10179 10260 10260
Log L -46602.76 -31768.98 -36234.83 -48637.73 -45470.46
FE Station Station Station Station Station
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population at the provincial level. Drought Index used
is SPEI, measured as standard deviation from mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2
CapeTown2018 Variable=1 for the jurisdictions aﬀected by strict rationing
Tables 5, 6, and 7 break these broader categories of crime into their
constituent crime types.
Table 5 breaks down violent crime into murder, attempted murder, and
common assault. These increase in jurisdictions under severe water rationing.
Reported numbers of assault with intent to harm are not aﬀected to the same
extent as the other violent crimes.
Table 6 splitsf aggravated robbery into its consituent crimes. The increase
in hijacking crimes in the face of stringent water rationing is quite large, at over
20%. The one type of robbery that does not show an increase in the Cape Town
area aﬀected by water rationing, is robbery at a non-residence: businesses do not
experience the same increase in robberies as individuals at home and on the street.
Table 7 shows the separate models for each police-detected crime in the
Western Cape region aﬀected by the water rationing. The coeﬃcients on the
ratioing indicator variable in the regression suggest that DUI and drug-related
crimes are less likely to be detected by police, while the eﬀect of the stringent
rationing on illegal possession of ﬁrearms is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Combining the percent increases from the estimated coeﬃcients with the
mean number of crimes in the stations that are aﬀected by the stringent rationing,
I calculate that the stringent rationing is associated with 335 murders, 502 car and
truck hijackings, 475 robberies at residence, and that 4470 DUIs went undetected.
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TABLE 5.
Changes in Violent Crimes: Continuous and Discrete Measures of Drought and Water
Regulations in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Murder Attempted Murder
Assault with
Intent to Harm
Common
Assault
CapeTown2018 0.0994∗∗ 0.149∗∗ -0.00843 0.0975∗∗∗
(0.0398) (0.0722) (0.0235) (0.0309)
Severe Drought -0.00758 -0.0446∗∗ 0.00357 0.00766
(0.0176) (0.0227) (0.0116) (0.0133)
Drought Index -0.00538 0.00776 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.00908
(0.00958) (0.0104) (0.00751) (0.00823)
No. obs. 10224 10143 10260 10260
Log L -22140.86 -22429.24 -40388.68 -39410.54
FE Station Station Station Station
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population
at the provincial level. Drought Index used is SPEI, measured as standard deviation from
mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2.
CapeTown2018 Variable=1 for the jurisdictions aﬀected by strict water rationing
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TABLE 6.
Changes in Aggravated Robbery Crimes: Continuous and Discrete Measures of Drought
and Water Regulations in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Car
Hijacking
Robbery
of Residence
Robbery
of Non-Residence
Truck
Hijacking
Cape Town 2018 0.233∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.0514 0.778∗∗∗
(0.0696) (0.0439) (0.0450) (0.146)
Severe Drought 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.0157 0.0472∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0198) (0.0262) (0.0732)
Drought Index -0.0567∗∗∗ -0.000539 -0.0209∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0341)
No. obs. 8532 9828 9747 5787
Log L -15126.61 -21619.46 -22282.82 -5617.76
FE Station Station Station Station
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population
at the provincial level. Drought Index used is SPEI, measured as standard deviation from
mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2.
CapeTown2018 Variable=1 for the jurisdictions aﬀected by strict water rationing
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TABLE 7.
Changes in Crimes Detected by Police Action: Continuous and Discrete Measures of
Drought and Water Regulations in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3)
DUI
Illegal Possesion
of Firearm
Drug Related
Crimes
Cape Town 2018 -0.385∗∗∗ 0.0128 -0.216∗∗∗
(0.0472) (0.0591) (0.0463)
Severe Drought -0.0913∗∗∗ -0.0411∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.0224) (0.0236)
Drought Index 0.0743∗∗∗ 0.00950 0.0605∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0102) (0.00931)
No. obs. 10134 9954 10242
Log L -32836.72 -21502.85 -42641.77
FE Station Station Station
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population
at the provincial level. Drought Index used is SPEI, measured as standard deviation
from mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2.
CapeTown2018 Variable=1 for the jurisdictions aﬀected by strict water rationing
Discussion
These sets of results suggest that drought is broadly associated with increases
in crime. Severe drought is associated with further increases in violent crimes, and
a reduction in police-detected crimes. The strict water rationing in Cape Town
is associated with a further increase in violent crime, and a further reduction in
police-detected crime.
These results broadly match those of Goin et al. (2017)that severe drought
causes an increase in crime. However, the results by type of crime are diﬀerent. In
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the California case, the drought was associated with a large increase in property
crime and a small increases in violent crime.
There are a few possible explanations for this discrepancy. The California
drought did not impose residential regulations as severe as those in Cape Town,
focusing instead mostly on agricultural regulations. South Africa also has a higher
baseline crime rate, for violent crime in particular. It is possible that both set of
estimates reﬂect what actually happened in each region. It is also possible that
the eﬀects of drought in one region will be somewhat diﬀerent for diﬀerent regions
at diﬀerent stages of development, for diﬀerent cultures, and for diﬀerent baseline
levels of conﬂict in general.
A diﬀerent explanation is that the crime statistics in South Africa may
not fully reﬂect the actual incidence of criminal behavior. The number of
reported crimes is a function of the number of crimes actually committed and
the percentage of crimes that are reported. Individuals report crime less often
when they believe the police will not dedicate time to ﬁnding the perpetrator
or recovering stolen property.9 It is possible that property-based crimes could
increase with the imposition of water use regulations, but that reporting rates
simultaneously decrease. This could result in reported crime counts being
relatively unchanged. I do not have access to any data on South African reporting
rates for these crimes. As mentioned in the data section, several South African
news outlets have expressed skepticism about the observation that property crimes
seem to be declining nationwide. If the reporting rates are changing at the same
rate across the country, the time ﬁxed eﬀects in the model would ensure that the
estimates are unbiased. However, if the reporting rates are changing diﬀerentially
9http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11632
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across drought and non-drought areas, these patterns could bias the estimates. In
particular, if reporting decreases in drought-aicted areas, we might fail to observe
an increase in reported crime, even though actual crime rates increase.
One source of information help ascertain whether reporting rates may be
changing in nontrivial ways. The Census Bureau of South Africa conducts an
annual survey of a random sample of 30,000 households. Among the questions
asked is whether the respondent has been a victim of a crime, as well as whether
they reported that crime. The survey respondents reported a ﬁve percent increase
from 20172018 in all crime including property-based crimes, while the data from
the South African Police Service shows no increase. The Census Bureau survey
also reports that the reporting rate for burglaries does not change. Unfortunately,
the Census Bureau does not disaggregate the survey-based information by province
or provide the microdata to determine whether the reporting rates are changing
diﬀerentially across provinces.
Police-detected crimes show a signiﬁcant reduction in drought areas
compared to the rest of the country. These types of crimes are reported as a
result of police setting up DUI checkpoints and observing crimes incidentally
while on patrol. Police resources may be substituted away from detecting these
crimes toward enforcing water usage. The police may also be aware of the
increase in violent crimes and may be reallocating their more-limited resources
towards solving and preventing more-serious crimes. It is also possible that we
are observing a true reduction in the incidence of drug use and DUI.10 With the
current dataset, however, I cannot formally test whether occurrence or detection is
decreasing.
10I do not have direct data on drug activity, alcohol use, or illegal ﬁrearm possession to
support either option.
35
Diﬀerential Eﬀects
To examine where crime responses are more pronounced, in this section I use
sub-samples of the data based on demographic variables. I partition the data along
one dimension at a time, into three groups deﬁned by the 25 percentile, the 75
percentile. These separate regressions will tell us whether the eﬀects of drought on
crime are diﬀerent for communities with diﬀerent sociodemographic characteristics.
Figure 9 shows the results for counts of violent crime regressed on drought
for subsamples according to the average income of the police jurisdiction. For the
most severe levels of drought, the point estimate is the smallest for the sample
with low levels of average income, and highest for jurisdictions with high levels of
average income. However, these estimates are not statistically diﬀerent from the
full sample estimate at a 5% signiﬁcance level.
Figure 10 shows the results of violent crime regressed on drought for
subsamples of urbanization. For the most severe levels of drought, the point
estimate is the largest for highly urban areas, and is lowest for areas that are less
urban (high farm or tribal). These estimates are also not statistically diﬀerent
from the full sample estimate at a 5% signiﬁcance level.
Figure 11 shows the results of violent crime regressed on drought for
subsamples of the Gini Coeﬃcient. The results of this subsampling do not vary the
estimates in a meaningful way. The point estimates for all subsamples are similar
to the full sample, and are not statistically diﬀerent from the full sample estimates.
Figure 12 shows the results of violent crime regressed on drought for
subsamples of the HH Index that measures racial homogeneity. For the
most severe levels of drought, the point estimate is the largest for the most
racially homogeneous jurisdictions, and lowest for the most racially fragmented
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jurisdictions. These subsampled estimates are also not statistically diﬀerent from
the full sample estimate at a 5% signiﬁcance level.
Together these results suggest that the increase in crime due to drought is
concentrated in the areas that are more urban with higher average income, and
that income inequality and racial fragmentation do not drive the increases in
violent crime.
FIGURE 9.
Changes in Violent Crime due to Drought. Subsamples based on Average Income of the
Police Jurisdiction
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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FIGURE 10.
Changes in Violent Crime due to Drought. Subsamples based on Urbanization of the
Police Jurisdiction
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Robustness Checks
Figure 13 shows a reproduction of Figure 8 using diﬀerent methods to
calculate the drought index at the station level. Inverse distance weighting of the
four nearest neighbors is used in the base speciﬁcation. This ﬁgure shows that
using ﬁve nearest neighbors or using inverse square weighting produce results
that are quantitatively similar and qualitatively identical. The ﬁgure also shows
the results when the previous years drought is used instead of the present years
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FIGURE 11.
Changes in Violent Crime due to Drought. Subsamples based on Gini Coeﬃcient of the
Police Jurisdiction
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
measure. The coeﬃcient values are attenuated using the prior years drought, but
have the same sign for each bin.
Figure 14 shows a placebo test consisting of a model with murder as the
dependent variable, employing the three drought-related variables included in
Table 4. For this ﬁgure, each year is given a dummy variable that is interacted
with the stations that are within the Cape Town water-regulatory area. The
speciﬁcation used is negative binomial and similar to the speciﬁcation used in
previous models for all of the crime types. Here, however, there are multiple
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FIGURE 12.
Changes in Violent Crime due to Drought. Subsamples based on HH Index (Racial
Homogeneity) of the Police Jurisdiction
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
indicators for alternative `treatment' years. The regression speciﬁcation is:
E[Crimeit] = exp(β1SPEIit+β2Droughtit+
2018∑
s=2011
β3sDsCapeTown2018i+γXit+αi+µt)
(2.3)
where Ds = 1 in year s and zero otherwise. The ﬁgure suggests that there was a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in crime rates during for 2015, as well as 2018. The anomaly
in 2015 is unexpected. This could be due to some phenomenon not observed in
the data, or it could be that 2015 was the ﬁrst year that any signiﬁcant drought
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FIGURE 13.
Changes in Violent Crimes due to Drought: Robustness to Diﬀerent Calculation of
Station Level Drought Index
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
hit the area, and that the city adjusted during 2016-2017 to some resulting mild
regulations, and the strict regulations implemented in 2018 caused crime to
increase once again.
Future Research
The current version of this paper has two sets of results. The ﬁrst set is the
eﬀect of drought in general as measured by SPEI and the second is the eﬀects in
Cape Town. Future research will put more emphasis on the general results, and
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FIGURE 14.
Placebo Test Varying Time of Treatment
focus less on the results using the Capetown2018 indicator variable. The severe
drought situation will be discussed as a potential mechanism for the general result.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the eﬀect of drought on crime. I use a spatially
disaggregated precipitation index (SPEI) to measure drought, and crime data from
the South African Police Service, to estimate whether drought and water shortages
aﬀect crime. I ﬁnd evidence that drought increases violent crimes, sex crimes,
robberies, and police detected crimes by about 2% for every 1-standard-deviation
reduction in rainfall, but that property crimes are unaﬀected. In addition, I ﬁnd
that the stringent rationing required to manage the drought in Cape Town was
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accompanied by an additional 10% increase in violent crimes and robbery, and that
police-detected crimes were 20% less likely to be documented.
In addition, I test this relationship using demographic data. These results
suggest that robbery-type crimes increase most in areas where incomes are
higher. Future research may be able to explore potential mechanisms more fully.
Microdata on crime, the victim, and the perpetrator would allow further studies to
identify speciﬁcally how changes in climate and water availability aﬀect crime.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that dry
regions are likely to experience less rainfall in the future and that droughts will
become more prevalent worldwide.11 These results suggest that scientists who
are studying and forecasting the impacts of climate change should consider the
potential impacts of severe droughts on crime. Policy-makers could also consider
the potential costs of crime when conducting beneﬁt-cost analysis to inform
climate-related decisions.
Appendix
Timing of Drought Regulations
February 1, 2017 - Level 3B
 Watering allowed only two days per week for a maximum of one hour per day
 No hoses or sprinklers allowed, only buckets or watering cans
 No washing of vehicles or boats
May 2017 - Level 4
11http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf
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 Consumption limited to 25 gallons per person per day
 Irrigation prohibited
July 2017 - Level 4B
 Consumption limited to 22 gallons per day
 Flushing toilets with greywater recommended
The next set of regulations were all implemented after the rainy season of 2017;
the total available water for the dry season was known.
September 2017 - Level 5
 Pools banned
 Manual toilet ﬂushing (buckets from greywater or laundry)
 Required registration of private well and boreholes
 Signage requirements when using well water or greywater for landscaping
January 2018 - Level 6
 Commerial properties to reduce comsumption by 45%
 Agriculture to reduce consumption by 60%
 Enforcement of residential restrictions via ﬁnes
February 2018 - Level 6B
 Restriction to 12.5 gallons per person per day
 Establishment of 200 water collection points across the city in preparation for
residential and commercial water supplies being shut oﬀ
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Data Processing
The unit of analysis is the station-year. The raw data from other sources
exists at diﬀerent spatial or temporal scales. This section outlines how these other
data sources have been aggregated to the police station level.
SPEI
The SPEI data are gridded at 0.5 degrees of latitude and longitude, and
are available in netCDF format.12 To combine these data with the station-
level crime data, I ﬁrst extract the SPEI values for all available latitudes and
longitudes of South Africa, and convert it to tidy" format (Wickham, 2014). To
match the SPEI values to the police station level, I ﬁrst calculate the centroid of
latitude and longitude for the jurisdiction of each police station. I then calculate
the coordinates of the four nearest neighbors on the SPEI grid. The set of four
neighbors was chosen because this provides a value in each basic cardinal direction.
The section on robustness checks veriﬁes that the basic results hold when diﬀerent
numbers of nearest neighbors are used. After determining the nearest neighbors,
inverse-distance weighting is used to calculate the SPEI value for each police
station. The formula for this calculation is:
Station SPEI =
Σ zi
di
Σ 1
di
(2.4)
where di is the distance to the grid point i, and zi is the SPEI value at grid point
i. Inverse-squared distance is also calculated for robustness. The formula for
12http://spei.csic.es/map/maps.html#months=1#month=6#year=2018
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inverse-squared distance is:
Station SPEI =
Σ zi
d2i
Σ 1
d2i
(2.5)
The SPEI data are available at the monthly level. The corresponding annual
SPEI level is calculated as the mean of the 12 monthly values from April to March,
corresponding to the ﬁscal year for reported crime statistics. The variance was also
computed for each year, but was not found to have a statistically signiﬁcant slope
coeﬃcient in the regressions. Data cleaning and conformation was accomplished
using MATLAB
Demographic Data
The demographic data are drawn from the South African census, as
distributed by statsSA. The data for the 2011 census are available at the ward
level. There are approximately six wards associated with each police station. The
2017 census is not yet available. The 2005 census and the 2016 community survey
(10%) sample are available at the municipal level which is a larger spatial unit.
The municipal levels are larger than the police station jurisdictions, and obtaining
demographic estimates would require disaggregation rather than aggregation. I
use the 2011 census as it is the only data available that is at a smaller spatial unit
than the police jurisdictions.
The jurisdictional boundaries for police stations do not match perfectly
with ward boundaries. Thus, areal interpolation was needed to generate
demographics at the police station level. I assume that the population is
distributed homogeneously across the area of each ward. For any ward that
46
crosses two or more police jurisdictions, the proportion of the population of the
ward that is assigned to each jurisdiction is assumed to be the proportion of the
ward's area that lies within each jurisdiction. This strategy creates a degree of
classical measurement error in the demographic variables, which will tend to bias
towards zero the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms in income, race
etc. The areal weights for this interpolation were constructed using ArcGIS, and
the calculations were done in Stata.
Tables
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TABLE 8.
Changes in Property Crimes: Continuous and Discrete Measures of Drought and Water Regulations in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Burglary at
Residence
Burglary at
Non-Residence Vehicle Theft Other Theft
Malicious Damage
to Property Shoplifting Arson
Cape Town 2018 0.0137 -0.0310 0.0238 -0.0185 0.0539 0.0499 0.380∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0348) (0.0419) (0.0365) (0.0510) (0.0574) (0.0545)
Severe Drought -0.0260∗∗ -0.0293∗∗ -0.0378∗ -0.0226∗ 0.0177 -0.0777∗ 0.0923∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0145) (0.0224) (0.0129) (0.0189) (0.0421) (0.0339)
Drought Index 0.0193∗∗ -0.0145∗∗ 0.0216∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.00779 0.00508 0.00416
(0.00758) (0.00606) (0.0124) (0.00696) (0.00585) (0.0183) (0.0121)
No. obs. 10260 10206 10125 10260 11400 8631 9918
Log L -42465.52 -33636.72 -25620.47 -47618.28 -39728.72 -24623.67 -16676.64
FE Station Station Station Station Station Station Station
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population
at the provincial level. Drought Index used is SPEI, measured as standard deviation
from mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2.
CapeTown2018 Variable=1 for the jurisdictions aﬀected by strict water rationing
TABLE 9.
Changes in Sex Crimes: Continuous and Discrete Measures of Drought and Water
Regulations in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3)
Rape Sexual Assault
Attempted
Sexual Assault
Cape Town 2018 -0.00786 0.0306 0.260∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0422) (0.0802)
Severe Drought 0.00107 0.0137 0.0444
(0.0146) (0.0261) (0.0401)
Drought Index 0.0121∗ -0.0293∗∗ 0.00488
(0.00733) (0.0129) (0.0146)
No. obs. 10242 10071 9810
Log L -29350.98 -17791.22 -13505.49
FE Station Station Station
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions include Year and Station ﬁxed eﬀects, and changes in population
at the provincial level. Drought Index used is SPEI, measured as standard deviation
from mean precipitation. Severe Drought Indicator=1 when SPEI <-2.
CapeTown2018 Variable=1 for the jurisdictions aﬀected by strict water rationing
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF DROUGHT ON MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Climate change is predicted to increase water scarcity and to cause droughts
to become more prevalent and intense (Gleick and Heberger, 2014). As a result of
increased water scarcity, some households may be compelled to reconsider where
they choose to live and work. Recent attention has focused on how drought and
heat have inﬂuenced international migration (Barrios et al., 2006; Mayda, 2010;
Cai et al., 2016; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Baez et al., 2017). However, there are
approximately three migrations within a country for every international migration
(McAuliﬀe, 2017), so it is crucial to also understand the subnational inﬂuence of
climate change on migration.
Previous empirical work that has looked at developing countries onlyhas
found mixed results concerning whether drought and climate inﬂuence migration.
Several studies ﬁnd that drought and temperature increase migration, others
ﬁnd no inﬂuence, and some have found that drought leads to reduced migration
caused by households stuck in a liquidity trap. These diﬀerent outcomes may be
due to the diﬀerent ways drought and heat aﬀect areas with diﬀerent levels of
development. Places dependent on agriculture are more aﬀected by climate change
and thus may be more prone to climate-induced migration. Places with a greater
level of development are more resilient and may be be less-aﬀected by climate
change because of the availability of insurance, the existence of a social safety net,
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and greater opportunity to substitute for deﬁcient rainwater with groundwater
(Hornbeck and Keskin, 2018).
To address this question I use a dataset of annual county-to-county migration
ﬂows for each county in the United states from 2000 to 2013. I ﬁrst estimate
migration between each pair of counties using a ﬁxed eﬀects model that controls
for unobserved time-invariant factors that determine the migration rates between
the pair. I ﬁnd that moderate and severe drought do not seem to inﬂuence
migration overall, but that exceptional drought appears to cause a reduction
in out-migration. I also ﬁnd that three consecutive years of moderate or higher
drought leads to a 2-3% reduction in out-migration. This is consistent with
droughts causing reductions in income or wealth that lead to liquidity constraints.
To explore further this relationship, I re-estimate these regressions using
diﬀerent subsamples of my data based on demographic variables (proportions,
typically) at the county level. I ﬁnd that consecutive years of drought tends
to reduce out-migration from places with lower than average median income,
higher than average poverty, and a higher than average proportion of foreign-born
individuals.
While there is a nascent literature examining how temperature and weather
aﬀect migration, to my knowledge there have been no prior works that examine
whether drought aﬀects migration choices within the United States or other more-
highly developed countries. These results suggest that drought does not drive out-
migration in the United States to the extent found in developing countries. This
suggests that adaptation through migration is not likely to play a strong role in
reducing climate change damages in the United States These results can inform
climate policy in the United States. If drought-induced migration will be limited,
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public policy may need to direct necessary aid those aﬀected by severe drought
who are less able to adapt by moving to a diﬀerent area.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on the link
between drought and climate and migration. Section 3 describes my data sources
and outlines the model used to estimate the impact of drought on migration.
Section 4 describes the results discusses their implications. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
Climate change is predicted to have wide-ranging social and economic
impacts, especially in developing countries. Prvious research has explored how
climate, temperature, and drought have inﬂuenced health, agricultural yields,
energy supplies, population, trade, and migration (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016;
Dell et al., 2014). How climate and natural disasters inﬂuence migration decisions
has also been studied extensively and reviewed in Millock (2015) and Berlemann
and Steinhardt (2017). These reviews stress that modern econometric methods,
using bilateral migration data and ﬁxed eﬀects estimators provide the most reliable
results by controlling for endogeneity in the migration decision between locations.
The inﬂuence of drought on migration has been studied in several diﬀerent
locations including Asian and African countries. These studies have typically
examined less developed countries (De Haan et al., 2002; Gray and Mueller, 2012;
Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris, 2012; Lewin et al., 2012; Drabo and Mbaye, 2015;
Alam et al., 2016; Koubi et al., 2016; Ng'ang'a et al., 2016; Taraz, 2017; Grace
et al., 2018; De Longueville et al., 2019). In many of these papers, it is stated that
high-development countries would not expect to see the same levels of drought and
climate induced migration.
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The theoretical underpinnings of migration were established by Roy (1959)
and Borjas (1989). In the midel, individuals choose whether to migrate in order to
maximize their own utility subject to their income at each location (net of moving
costs). They also consider other factors such as cultural diﬀerences, politics, public
goods, and the locations of family and friends. The individual migrates if their
expected utility is higher in the destination than in the origin (Clark et al., 2007;
Mayda, 2010). Beine and Parsons (2015) further develop the basic model to allow
for individuals to fall in a poverty trap. This situation is deﬁned as when there
could be positive returns to migration, but the individual cannot aﬀord the initial
moving costs. If poor environmental or climate conditions occur in a place where
these constraints are present, the climate-induced income reductions would cause
the trap to become stronger and reduce migration rates.
Climate change has become a pressing issue, and a recent literature has
developed to analyze how changes in climate and environmental conditions
aﬀect migration decisions. This topic has been studied mainly in the setting
of developing countries where populations could be the most vulnerable to
climate change. Marchiori et al. (2012) investigate whether rain and temperature
anomalies in Sub-Saharan Africa aﬀect internal or international migration, and
ﬁnd that both types of migration increase. Dallmann and Millock (2013) ﬁnd
that increased frequencies of drought increase migration by about 2% for every
consecutive month of drought in India. However, they ﬁnd that the magnitudes
and durations of the droughts do not matter. Kubik and Maurel (2016) ﬁnd that
medium-income and high-income households in Tanzania migrate in response
to drought but poor households are less likely to do so, indicating the possible
presence of liquidity traps. Baez et al. (2017) ﬁnd that unskilled workers migrate
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more due to drought in Central American and the Caribbean. Alam et al. (2016)
ﬁnd that the poor, the landless, and the less educated migrate most in response
to climate in Bangladesh. Drabo and Mbaye (2015) examine how drought and
other natural disasters aﬀect international migration from developing countries
to the OECD and conclude that drought increases the rate of brain drain from
developing countries.
There have also been studies which ﬁnd that drought and climate cause
reductions in migration. Lewin et al. (2012) ﬁnd a 21% reduction in out-migration
for areas that have experienced recent drought conditions in Malawi and Grace
et al. (2018) ﬁnd that low rainfall reduces out-migration in rural Mali. Both
Malawi and Malu studies propose that the drought reduces income so that
individuals are then unable to pay the costs necessary to migrate.
Some recent papers have speciﬁcally examined the role of agriculture in
climate-induced migration. Cai et al. (2016) ﬁnd that internal migration is
inﬂuenced only by temperature in the most agriculture-dependent countries.
Cattaneo and Peri (2016) use a similar estimation strategy to infer that higher
temperatures increase rural-to-urban migration in middle-income countries, but
they reduce the probability of migration in poor countries.
There have been few studies that examine how climate change aﬀects
migration in the context of high-income countries. Feng et al. (2015) examine
how temperature inﬂuenced migration in the United States, and they ﬁnd that
a measurable eﬀect is present only in corn-belt states. The present paper adds
several dimensions to that earlier analysis. I leverage my data on bilateral
migration patterns to include origin-county pair ﬁxed eﬀects instead of just origin
ﬁxed eﬀects. My dataset also has ﬁner temporal resolution with annual migration
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instead of a ﬁve-year timescale. I also examine the eﬀect of drought using the
Palmer Index instead of just extreme temperatures.
Data
I use the annual IRS statistics of Income (SOI) data on bilateral county-to-
county migration ﬂows within the United States for the tax years 20002013. The
data consists of counts of tax returns that report a county change in the primary
address during the tax year. Due to privacy concerns, the data are censored if
there are less than 10 migrations for a county pair. The majority of the analysis in
this paper uses a balanced panel dataset that includes all county pairs having had
10 or more migrations for all 14 years in the dataset. This dataset thus contains 14
years of data for 46,383 county-pairs for a total of 649,362 observations.1
Figure 15 shows the time series of total migrations in the SOI data. The
ﬁgure shows that there is a general upward trend in the number of migrations, but
that the years 20092011 had a reduction. Several papers have documented that
the Great Recession temporarily reduced migration (Kothari et al., 2013; Ravuri,
2017).
The drought measure I use is the U.S. Drought Monitor (USDM) developed
by the USDA and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.2 This index is created using
a variety of inputs to fully capture local conditions. The inputs include the Palmer
Drought Severity Index and the Standardized Precipitation Index that measure
rainfall compared to historical averages. The USDM also incorporates soil moisture
1My analysis is thus limited to explanation of signiﬁcant internal migration ﬂows for the
U.S. Furthermore, while the data continue past the 2013 tax year, the censoring is changed to
report migration only if 20 or more households migrate. In future work, it will be possible to
combine both levels of censoring explicitly in the model.
2https://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/Data/DataDownload.aspx
55
FIGURE 15.
Number of Migrations within the United States over time
models, satellite based assessments of vegetation health, and measures that help
assess local conditions such as mountain snowpack and surface water supply.
Drought is classiﬁed in four categories according to increasing severity, moderate,
severe, extreme, and exceptional. Figure 16 shows a map of the USDM for the
continental United States comparing June 2019, a time of minimal drought to June
2018 when drought was more prevalent, particularly in the southwest.
The drought data include the percentage of the population that is exposed
to drought for each county in the United States. To calculate this measure, the
USDM determines the number of people that live in each classiﬁcation area
based on US census data and then aggregate to the county level. These data are
available monthly, and for this paper have been aggregated for each origin and
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FIGURE 16.
Map of US Drought Monitor
(a) (b)
(c)
destination pair by computing the mean for the twelve months between each tax
deadline, when changes in county of residence are recorded by the IRS.3 Table 10
shows summary statistic for the various drought measures and other variables
Figure 17 shows a time series of population exposure to severe drought
over time. Comparing this time series to Figure 15 we can see that, on aggregate,
the number of migrations is not determined exclusively by drought conditions.
Although total migrations are not obviously driven by drought exposure, drought
may inﬂuence migration behavior for selected subgroups of the U.S. population.
3The standard deviation was also calculated, but was not signiﬁcant in any regression. So all
results use the mean only
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TABLE 10.
Summary Statistics
(1)
.
mean sd min max
Rate of Out-migration (per 10,000 ) 7.9 17 0.011 660
Origin: Population (Thousands) 658 1180 2.2 9520
Origin: Prop. pop abnormally dry 15.8 15.5 0 100
Origin: Prop. pop mod drought 11.1 15.7 0 100
Origin: Prop. pop severe drought 7.25 14.5 0 100
Origin: Prop. pop extreme drought 3.38 10.5 0 100
Origin: Prop. pop exceptional drought 1.09 6.38 0 96.2
Destination: Prop. pop abnormally dry 16.0 15.5 0 100
Destination: Prop. pop mod drought 11.4 15.8 0 100
Destination: Prop. pop severe drought 7.53 14.8 0 100
Destination: Prop. pop extreme drought 3.55 10.7 0 100
Destination: Prop. pop exceptional drought 1.17 6.60 0 96.2
Observations 649362
Note: An observation is an Origin-Destination pair by year.
There are 2870 Origin Counties and 2818 Destination Counties
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To discern the incremental eﬀect of drought on migration, it is appropriate to
control for other types of climate-related severe weather, as well as demographics
at the county level. Disaster data are obtained from SHELDUS.4 Demographic
data for each county is obtained from the American Community Survey.5
FIGURE 17.
Average percent of population that is aﬀected by severe or higher drought within the
United States over time
4https://cemhs.asu.edu/sheldus
5https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs
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Empirical Model
To investigate the relationship between migration decisions and drought, I
estimate the following ﬁxed eﬀects regression model:
ln(# Migrations)ijt = β0 + β1Droughtit + β2Droughtjt + β3Xit + β4Xjt
+ αij + δt + εijt (3.1)
Where (ln# Migrations)ijt is the natural logarithm of the number of
migrations between origin county i and destination county j during tax year t
for this set of signiﬁcant migration ﬂows. Droughtit and Droughtjt are measures
of drought in the origin and destination counties respectively in year t. Various
drought measures are used, including the continuous measure of the percentage of
the population that is exposed to drought, as well as discrete variables indicating
the county is exposed to a certain severity of drought. Xit and Xjt are control
variable for the origin and destination counties in year t and include demographics
for the county, employment values, as well as natural disasters.6
The αij are origin-destination county ﬁxed eﬀects. These ﬁxed eﬀects will
control for factors that could inﬂuence the number of migrations such as the
populations of the origin and destination, distance, urbanization, as well as
unobservable factors such as historical and cultural closeness. This model allows
me to estimate the changes in migration due to drought within each county pair.
The δt are time ﬁxed eﬀects to control for any time variation that is constant
across all county pairs. The error term, εijt is clustered at the origin-state and
destination-state level unless otherwise speciﬁed. The key parameters of interest
6The natural disasters that are controlled for include ﬂooding, hailstorms, heat waves,
hurricanes, severe storms, tornadoes, wildﬁres, and wind storms, and severe winter weather
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are β1 and β2 which capture changes in migration ﬂows due to drought in the
origin and destination counties.
To explore whether changes in migration are driven systematically by socio-
economic conditions, I estimate the main regression using subsamples based on
demographics in the origin county. The results of these regressions will allow me
to determine whether drought on migration may have disproportionate eﬀects on
speciﬁc subgroups of the population.
Results
Table 11 shows the results of a regression of county-to-county migration ﬂows
on various factors that may contribute to migration. The ﬁrst column shows the
results of an OLS regression of the number of migrations on factors that may
contribute to that migration decision. These results show that the number of
migrations decreases with distance, and decreases further when the destination is
not in the same state. Higher population in origin and destination counties results
in more migrations. The coeﬃcients on the demographic variables suggest that
people below the poverty line and people above the age of 65 migrate less often,
and that people migrate more often from places that are more urbanized and that
have higher average wages.
The coeﬃcients on the destination variables suggest that people migrate into
places that have low poverty rates and higher average wages. They also migrate
into places that have high urbanization, but that are less urbanized than their
origin. The proportion of people that are over 65 does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating this does not inﬂuence their destination choice.
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The second column shows the results with the addition of a indicator
variables that take a value of 1 if severe or worse drought aﬀects 25% of the county
population. The coeﬃcients on the drought variables are both insigniﬁcant, and
the coeﬃcients on the control variables are relatively unchanged.
The third and fourth column add ﬁxed eﬀects at the origin county and the
destination county respectively. Most of the coeﬃcients are relatively unchanged.
The one coeﬃcient that does change is that with origin ﬁxed eﬀects the destination
county being more urban is signiﬁcant and positive. The coeﬃcients on the
drought varaibles remain insigniﬁcant with the addition or these ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 12 shows the results of the panel model with ﬁxed eﬀects for each
origin-destination pair. In this model, the control variables shown in Table 11 are
subsumed by these ﬁxed eﬀects. Fixed eﬀects for each origin-destination pair also
control for any other non time-varying characteristics of each pair of counties that
may be unobservable, such as cultural or historical distance. In this model, the
drought variables are continuous variables for the percentage of the population of
each county that is aﬀected by drought. The droughts are categorized as moderate
drought, severe drought, extreme drought, or exceptional drought.
Column (1) in Table 12 shows the results for the full sample. Drought in
the origin does not appear to have an eﬀect on the choice to migrate, as all the
categories of drought have insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcient on abnormally
dry is signiﬁcant and positive. The coeﬃcients on drought in the destination
county do have some signiﬁcance, and are negative, suggesting that people are less
likely to move to counties when the destination county is experiencing a drought.
The potentially surprising result in this table is the positive coeﬃcient to the most
severe category of drought in destination counties and the negative coeﬃcient
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TABLE 11.
Factors that Determine Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(# Migrations)
No FE
ln(# Migrations)
No FE
ln(# Migrations)
Origin County
FE
ln(# Migrations)
Destination County
FE
Distance(1000 miles) -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗
(0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0357) (0.0296)
Origin: Population (100,000 people) 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗
(0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00271)
Origin: Percent below poverty line -0.00532∗∗∗ -0.00532∗∗∗ -0.00521∗
(0.00168) (0.00169) (0.00284)
Origin: Prop. pop 65+ -0.00651∗∗ -0.00651∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗
(0.00322) (0.00322) (0.00275)
Origin: Prop. Urban 0.0842 0.0842 0.306∗∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0571) (0.0748)
Origin: Payroll per employee 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗
(0.00514) (0.00512) (0.0162)
Destination: Population(100,000 people) 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.00273) (0.00273) (0.00293)
Destination: Percent below poverty line -0.00625∗∗∗ -0.00624∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00182) (0.00218)
Destination: Prop. Urban 0.0434 0.0436 0.185∗
(0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0935)
Destination: Payroll per employee 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗
(0.00592) (0.00589) (0.0156)
Destination: more urban -0.0198 -0.0199 0.106∗∗ -0.0594
(0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0467) (0.0371)
Destination: Prop. pop 65+ -0.00571∗ -0.00572∗ -0.00501
(0.00305) (0.00305) (0.00492)
SameState 0.497∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0470) (0.0507)
Any Drought in Origin 0.00217 -0.0115 0.00488
(0.0108) (0.0193) (0.0205)
Any Drought in Destination -0.00383 0.0220 -0.00509
(0.0134) (0.0299) (0.0131)
No. obs. 578350 578350 157404 155774
Time FE Year Year Year Year
FE None None Origin County Origin County
Clustering Orig/Dest State Orig/Dest State Orig/Dest State Orig/Dest State
Standard errors in parentheses
Column (1) shows factors that may inﬂuence migration with no ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (2) adds dummy variables at the origin
and destination county if more than 25% of the population if aﬀected by drought.
Column (3) includes origin ﬁxed eﬀects and Column (4) includes destination ﬁxed eﬀects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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on the exposure in the origin county, although this coeﬃcient is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 12 show the same regression results when the
sample is limited by origin county to the 40% most rural and 40% lowest median
income counties. For these subsamples, the coeﬃcient on exceptional drought in
the origin is signiﬁcant and negative indicating that lower income and more rural
areas may be exposed to liquidity traps. Otherwise, the coeﬃcients are similar
across the diﬀerent subsamples.
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TABLE 12.
Changes in ln(Migration) due to Drought
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample More Rural Counties Poorer Counties
Origin: Prop. pop abnormally dry 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗ 0.0154
(0.00922) (0.00899) (0.00949)
Origin: Prop. pop mod drought 0.0219∗ 0.0108 0.0203∗
(0.0129) (0.00981) (0.0117)
Origin: Prop. pop severe drought 0.00853 0.00145 0.00260
(0.00934) (0.00982) (0.00828)
Origin: Prop. pop extreme drought 0.0191 0.0271∗∗ 0.0156
(0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0184)
Origin: Prop. pop exceptional drought -0.0434 -0.0474∗∗ -0.0805∗∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0220) (0.0272)
Destination: Prop. pop abnormally dry -0.0286∗∗ -0.0147 -0.0261∗∗
(0.0117) (0.00987) (0.0113)
Destination: Prop. pop mod drought 0.000734 -0.00381 0.00989
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0105)
Destination: Prop. pop severe drought -0.0348∗∗∗ -0.0107 -0.0226∗
(0.0131) (0.0105) (0.0122)
Destination: Prop. pop extreme drought -0.00423 -0.00777 0.00631
(0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0131)
Destination: Prop. pop exceptional drought 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0655∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0226) (0.0271)
No. obs. 649362 260120 245084
FE Orig-Dest pair Orig-Dest pair Orig-Dest pair
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Orig & Dest State Orig & Dest State Orig & Dest State
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Other control variables include ﬂooding, hailstorms, heat waves, hurricanes, severe storms, tornadoes, wildﬁres, and
wind storms, and severe winter weather in origin and destination counties.
Omitted Categories: Origin: Prop. pop no drought and Destination: Prop. pop no drought
Figure 18 shows the eﬀects of drought on migration when the drought is
measured as a single discrete indicator. This will allow me to test the eﬀects of
multi-year drought events. This variable takes a value of 1 if some percentage
of the origin county's population is exposed to moderate or worse drought and
0 otherwise. Each ﬁgure summarized the key coeﬃcient estimate from each of
20 separate models that occurs as the threshold of exposed population is varied
from 5% to 95%. Figure 18a shows the coeﬃcients for diﬀerent proportions
of moderate or worse drought in just the same year as the migration. The
parameter estimate is insigniﬁcant for all values of the population threshold.7.
Figure 18b-d show the results of a similar regression, but the indicator
variable for drought takes a value of 1 if there are two, three, or four consecutive
years of drought. There is suggestive evidence that two consecutive years of
drought reduces out-migration as more of the county population is aﬀected. This
evidence becomes stronger when there are three years of drought, as the negative
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant when the threshold is designated as 40 percent or more
of the population. Four consecutive years of drought has a similar result, but the
parameters are measured with larger error due to fewer counties being aﬀected by
drought for this long.
Figure 19 Shows a reproduction of Figure 18c, for exposure to three
consecutive years of drought with subsamples of the origin counties. Each
subsample is the top 40% of the origin counties according to a speciﬁed
demographic variable in the benchmark year of, 2007. The ﬁgures shows that
origin counties with larger shares of households with low income, high rates of
7Migration may have occured at any time during the 12 months since the last tax deadline.
Droughts are more likely to occur in the summer, so any-same-year drought could have occurred
after many of the migration events recorded for a given tax-year took place
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FIGURE 18.
Changes in Migration due to Drought Lasting Multiple Years
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
poverty, and foreign born residents have the largest reduction in out-migration as a
consequence of moderate or worse drought. The coeﬃcient estimates increase from
about 2% to about 4%. These demographics are those that are associated with low
income and high poverty, indicating that this eﬀect is likely caused by liquidity
constraints. Counties that are more rural, higher percentage farms, higher percent
latino, higher percent black, and higher percent working age population exhibit
patterns similar to those in the full sample, indicating that these variables do not
change the overall pattern.
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FIGURE 19.
Changes in Migration due to Drought Lasting Multiple Years. Samples Based on top 40%
of Demographic in the Origin County
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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(e) (f)
(g) (h)
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Discussion
The results show that contemporaneous drought has a small impact
on migration decisions. Many of the coeﬃcients on the drought variables are
insigniﬁcant indicating no eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on exceptional drought in the
origin county indicates that a change from 0% of the population aﬀected by
exceptional drought to 100% aﬀected by exceptional drought would reduce out-
migration by 4% from the mean migration for that origin-destination county pair.
The estimates from the discrete drought indicator are similar in magnitude.
Three consecutive years of drought reduces out-migration by 2-4% from the mean
of the county pair. The 95% conﬁdence intervals cover a range of 2-6%. This result
is smaller in magnitude than the estimates from Ethiopia, Tanzania, India, and
Malawi that are about 5-10 times larger (Gray and Mueller, 2012; Lewin et al.,
2012; Dallmann and Millock, 2013; Kubik and Maurel, 2016).
The results for models that explore the eﬀects of multiple-year droughts in
the U.S. indicate that persistent drought appear to lock people in to their current
location, rather than forcing out-migration. Theoretical models of migration do
suggest that liquidity constraints could prevent people from migrating, even if
the returns to migration would be positive. Modestino and Dennett (2013) and
Andersson and Mayock (2014) ﬁnd that migration is reduced when housing prices
are lower, particularly when homeowners are underwater on their mortgages.
This is another plausible channel for how drought could reduce out-migration in
the U.S. in addition to individuals that do not have the means to migrate.8 Future
8The appendix includes results when the percent of home that have their price reduced is
included in the regression. The coeﬃcients are negative for both origin and destination counties,
indicating this may be a plausible channel for households reducing out-migration due to poor
environmental conditions
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research could explore whether drought has an inﬂuence on housing prices that
could be causing this eﬀect.
Barbier and Hochard (2018) suggest that migration could be a way to adapt
to climate change by reducing the costs of climate change. They suggest that when
economic activity becomes less-suited to local conditions, migration will allow
individuals and industries to reoptimize by moving to the locations where utility
levels or proﬁts will be maximized under the new climate regime. These results
suggest that rather than allowing climate-change costs to be mitigated through
this type of adaptation, increased prevalence of drought may reduce mobility
within the United States and moreso for some less-advantaged groups.
Future Research
Further analysis of this project will include creating a panel with data that is
presently truncated. Including origin-destination pairs that are below the censoring
threshold for some years, and using a tobit-type model will allow me to include
more counties in the sample.
In addition, I will work to improve the results using cumulative drought
measures. Currently the results show a range of possible cutoﬀs. Future versions
will choose a cutoﬀ, and then show that the results are robust to other cutoﬀs that
are similar.
I will also include robustness checks to diﬀerent ways of measuring the
drought, including using seasonal or monthly indicators instead of the annual
mean.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀects of drought on migration ﬂows in the
United States. My results suggest that a single year of drought has minimal
impact on migration, but that multi-year droughts seem to reduce out-migration.
This reduction in geographic mobility could be due to households facing liquidity
constraints and being unable or unwilling to pay the up-front moving costs. This
result is stronger for origin counties that have higher poverty rates and lower
incomes, indicating that low-income households are disproportionately aﬀected.
However, I do not ﬁnd evidence that minority groups or more employment in
agriculture are similarly aﬀected by drought exposure.
These lesser mobilities in response to drought should be considered as climate
change policy is developed and enacted. Developing optimal climate change
policy requires full knowledge of the costs (and any potential beneﬁts) and the
distribution of individual net beneﬁts across the population. Migration has been
proposed as both a cost of climate change, and as a mechanism to reduce costs
through adaptation. The results of this paper suggest that, at least in the United
States, migration will not play a strong role in mitigating costs, and that people
are likely to continue to live in areas that suﬀer damage. To preserve people's well-
being if they remain exposed, other types of adaptation will be necessary.
Future studies could examine liquidity traps and potential mechanisms,
particularly whether people are more likely to be facing income traps where they
cannot aﬀord the moving costs, or whether the causes are less direct such as loss of
property value. It would also be valuable to study how drought and climate aﬀect
migration in other high-income regions such as the European Union.
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Appendix
Table 13 Shows the results of the panel regression with the inclusion of
percent of homes that have their price reduced in origin and destination counties.
This variable is a good indicator for when the housing market is in a downturn.
The coeﬃcient is negative for both origin and destination counties. This indicates
that origin counties with weaker housing markets do see reduced out-migration,
and that destination counties with weaker housing markets also see less in-
migration.
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TABLE 13.
Changes in ln(Migration) due to Drought
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample More Rural Counties Poorer Counties
Origin: Prop. pop abnormally dry 0.0000151 -0.0000667 -0.000328
(0.000172) (0.000165) (0.000232)
Origin: Prop. pop mod drought -0.000222 0.0000309 -0.000141
(0.000167) (0.000182) (0.000234)
Origin: Prop. pop severe drought 0.000126 -0.0000368 -0.000223
(0.000169) (0.000154) (0.000166)
Origin: Prop. pop extreme drought -0.0000776 0.000288 0.0000595
(0.000249) (0.000288) (0.000248)
Origin: Prop. pop exceptional drought -0.000379∗∗ -0.000576∗ -0.00125∗∗∗
(0.000148) (0.000326) (0.000178)
Destination: Prop. pop abnormally dry 0.0000386 0.000125 0.000247
(0.000162) (0.000161) (0.000213)
Destination: Prop. pop mod drought -0.0000708 -0.000277 -0.00000302
(0.000108) (0.000187) (0.000160)
Destination: Prop. pop severe drought 0.000390 0.000249 0.000725∗∗∗
(0.000258) (0.000180) (0.000232)
Destination: Prop. pop extreme drought -0.00000700 -0.0000115 0.000103
(0.000204) (0.000239) (0.000177)
Destination: Prop. pop exceptional drought -0.000318 -0.0000531 0.000109
(0.000218) (0.000218) (0.000226)
Origin: Percent Price Cuts -0.00420∗ -0.00459∗∗ -0.00776∗∗∗
(0.00233) (0.00178) (0.00204)
Destination: Percent Price Cuts -0.00539∗∗∗ -0.00316∗∗ -0.00359∗∗
(0.00146) (0.00157) (0.00137)
No. obs. 107865 36597 39291
FE Orig-Dest pair Orig-Dest pair Orig-Dest pair
Time FE? Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by: Orig/Dest State Orig/Dest State Orig/Dest State
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Other control variables include ﬂooding, hailstorms, heat waves, hurricanes, severe storms, tornadoes, wildﬁres,
and wind storms, and severe winter weather in origin and destination counties
Omitted Categories: Origin: Prop. pop no drought and Destination: Prop. pop no drought
CHAPTER IV
DO HOUSING BUBBLES AFFECT HEDONIC PROPERTY VALUE
ESTIMATES? A MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENT
Introduction
The hedonic property value model has been used since the 1970s to evaluate
the beneﬁts of environmental quality and other amenities and disamenities
and local public goods. The model allows the researcher to infer how much
individuals are willing to pay for marginal improvements of their neighborhoods.
Hedonic property value models are ubiquitous in determining the value of clean
air (Chay and Greenstone, 2005), crime (Linden and Rockoﬀ, 2008), shale
gas development (Muehlenbachs et al., 2015; Delgado et al., 2016), and EPA
regulations (Mastromonaco, 2015)
In a typical hedonic regression, the logarithm of the purchase price of
residential properties is regressed on the characteristics of the property. The
coeﬃcients on the independent cariables are interpreted as the implicit price of
the characteristics. A key assumption in these speciﬁcations is that the purchase
price of the property is its fundamental value; the present value of the expected
future net beneﬁts from the property over its lifetime. The expected net beneﬁts
of the property will determine the rental price. Mathematically, this assumption
implies that Pi =
∑T
t=1
rentit
(1+r)t
, where rentit is the market rental rate and Pi is the
selling price of the property, and T is the expected life of the property (Phaneuf
and Requate, 2017). In the presence of a bubble in the housing market, this
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assumption is likely to be violated, and this has not previously been studied by
economists.
Intuitively, we can use the deﬁnition of bubbles suggested by Stiglitz (1990):
If the reason that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the
selling price will be high tomorrowwhen `fundamental' factors do not seem to
justify such a pricethen a bubble exists. At least in the short run, the high price
of the asset is merited, because it yields a return (capital gain plus dividend) equal
to that on alternative assets
Phillips and Yu (2011) published a seminal paper on detecting the presence
of bubbles empirically. Figure 19 reproduces a ﬁgure from their paper that shows
the housing price index divided by the rental price index for the United States.
FIGURE 19.
House Price Relative to Rental Price
While the ratio of selling price to rental price was relatively constant from 1990
to the early 2000s, this ratio changed drastically during the 2000s. This timing
coincides with the presence of the bubble detected in their paper. Several studies
in the real estate economics literature have likewise concluded that housing prices
do not always represent the fundamental value of the property. Selling prices
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follow boom and bust trends more than rental prices, and the rental and purchase
prices of properties are not cointegrated (Case et al., 1994; Gallin, 2008; Mikhed
and Zemic, 2009).
The presence of bubbles is a somewhat controversial topic within economics.
Many researchers are uncomfortable with bubbles as they require some amount of
behavioral biases. Prior to the collapse of the housing market during 20062008,
many economists, including former chairmen of the Federal Reserve Alan
Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, believed that housing prices would stabilize. Several
prominent papers written before the collapse also claimed that there was little
evidence of bubble behavior (Case and Shiller, 2003; Leung, 2004; Himmelberg
et al., 2005).
The presence of the bubble can cause omitted variable bias (OVB) in
measurement of the ﬁrst-stage hedonic price function. In general, the standard
quasi-experimental technique for correcting OVB may not be suﬃcient. When
the pricing bubble is correlated with housing attributes, the bubble may generate
dynamics in housing prices that are too complex to be corrected using quasi-
experimental techniques.
Using Monte Carlo techniques, I simulate a housing market that undergoes
a bubble in the housing market. I thne estimate the MWTP for an environmental
amenity without considering the eﬀects of the bubble. I ﬁnd that the estimate of
the MWTP for the environmental amenity is biased away from zero, and that the
size of this bias increases with the size of the bubble.
The housing market provides us with a useful tool for evaluating how much
individuals are willing to pay for environmental amenities. Researchers can use
instances where the environmental amenity diﬀers spatially or changes temporally,
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and estimate how this diﬀerence in the amenity is related to diﬀerences in the
rental price of a property, i.e. MWTP = ∂rent
∂q
where q represents the amount of
the environmental amenity. It is more common to use the purchase price rather
than rental price as it is typically much more available for analysis (Phaneuf
and Requate, 2017). When there is not a constant relationship between implicit
rental rates and selling prices, as during 20022008, the naive assumption that
∂Pi
∂q
= MWTP needs to be scrutinized.
After the collapse of the housing market, there has been more focus on
econometric detection of the presence of bubbles both in the housing market and
for other assets. New research also allows for measurement of speciﬁc attributes
of these bubbles, such as the length of the bubble and the strength of the eﬀect
(Lammerding et al., 2013; Kivedal, 2013; Etienne et al., 2014).
Examples that may illustrate how the issue of bubbles can interact with
the hedonic property value model can be drawn from several studies that have
estimated the willingness to pay for better school districts, e.g. Black (1999),
Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011), and Kuminoﬀ and Pope (2014). Some
individuals pay a premium for housing so that their children may attend higher-
quality schools. However, some properties in the high-quality school districts are
purchased by individuals who do not have children in school, and some may not
even have children. These individuals do not have any intrinsic preference for
better schools. They may pay the price premium for properties in better school
districts with the belief that they can sell the property in the future for an even
higher premium.
Boyle et al. (2012) discuss some of the implications that a housing bubble
may have for hedonic property value estimation. They warn that caution must be
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used in interpreting hedonic coeﬃcients estimated from data during a housing
bubble. They also provide guidance with a set of empirical best practices,
and recommend quasi-experimental techniques with time ﬁxed eﬀects that are
interacted with the housing characteristics, to control for changes in the shape of
the price function over time. However, this strategy acquiesces to the literature
claiming that changes in the housing market represent changes in the fundamental
values of the properties involved, rather than just to the presence of a bubble.
This paper adds to the extensive literature that has examined and critiqued
the hedonic property value model. Rosen (1974) developed the basic theoretical
foundation for the model. Several authors have since reﬁned the theory, and
studied how to interpret the estimated coeﬃcients of hedonic regressions (Bartik,
1987; Ekeland et al., 2002, 2004; Yinger and Nguyen-Hoang, 2016). One of the
central tenets of Rosen's theory is that the implicit price of the attributes of
the homes is given by the tangent of the buyer's bid curves and the seller's oﬀer
curves. The combined envelope of these two functions deﬁnes the implicit price
that can be interpreted as the MWTP for those attributes. Of course the hedonic
price function need not necessarily remain the same over time. Changes to sellers'
costs are expected if technology improves or the prices of inputs change, causing
their oﬀer curves to change. As time progresses, we expect income growth and
changes in preferences to change buyers' bid curves, and therefore the equilibrium
implicit prices will also change. However, these changes are separate from any
distortions that a housing bubble may cause. There is nothing in the hedonic
regression that can separately identify (1) the eﬀects of a bubble from (2) the
eﬀects of changing implicit prices. We observe only the selling price, which
includes both of these eﬀects.
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Due to this problem, this research project employs Monte Carlo techniques.
In the Monte Carlo data simulation the true underlying preferences of the buyers,
and the characteristics of the properties available for sale are known. This allows
me to hold the bid and oﬀer curves constant, and permit me to observe the eﬀects
of the bubble only.
Many studies have also looked at the empirical implementation of the
hedonic property value model to determine the best practices for obtaining
unbiased and eﬃcient estimates, e.g. Atkinson and Crocker (1987), Taylor
(2003), Chay and Greenstone (2005), and Parmeter and Pope (2012), etc. The
general focus of these studies is the extent to which hedonic estimates are biased
due to diﬀerent types of omitted variables bias (OVB) that may be caused by
unobservable features of the house or the neighborhood. Previous research has
not examined if these quasi-experimental techniques correct for the presence of a
bubble in the housing market.
This paper most closely follows Cropper et al. (1988) and Kuminoﬀ et al.
(2010), who use Monte Carlo experiments to determine the best functional form to
use in the ﬁrst-stage hedonic regression and the best use of spatial ﬁxed eﬀects.
The key diﬀerence between their work and mine is that they assume that the
observed price is the fundamental price and simulate over the hedonic parameters.
My work simulates over the housing stock and buyers to deﬁne the initial hedonic
parameters, and then holds these ﬁxed. I then simulate the evolution of observed
prices through a bubble-generating process. Finally, I estimate the hedonic model
to verify whether the true parameters can be recovered.
To simulate data a set of properties to be sold and the sales price of an
equal number of households buying. I adapt the algorithm used in Kuminoﬀ and
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Jarrah (2010). Their algorithm ﬁrst samples the housing stock from a database
of properties in a single market. It then generates individuals with preferences
drawn from known distributions and having demographics based on data from
the same area where the properties in the database are located. Then a second-
price bidding auction is conducted to assign each individual to a property. It is
assumed that individuals cannot change the characteristics of the house (either the
environmental amenity or the house characteristics), they merely purchase from
the stock that is available.1
After the fundamental prices are generated, the prices go through the
simulation of an asset pricing bubble. Thebubble generation process is explained in
detail below. The bubble expands, and may suddenly contract. Home purchasers
may assign some probability to the collapse of the bubble, but do not know when
the collapse will occur.
After the Monte Carlo data have been generated, estimation proceeds using
the standard hedonic property value model:
ln(Pi) = xiβ + θqi + εi
where xi is a vector of characteristics of the property (number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, lot size, square footage, etc.) and qi is the neighborhood
amenity of interest. The measured parameter of interest, θ, can then be compared
to the true hedonic property value function underlying the Monte Carlo data-
generation process.
1In the long run, individuals can improve or build on their property. If they are doing so
because they are expecting the standard return on investment, this will meet equation (4) in the
long run. If they are doing so because they are expecting the high returns of a bubble, then their
behavior will violate equation (4)
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To identify cleanly parameters such as θ two commonly used quasi-
experimental techniques are employed: (1) a border discontinuity model, where
q changes discretely at a known geographic boundary (Black, 1999; Nguyen-Hoang
and Yinger, 2011; Kuminoﬀ and Pope, 2014) and (2) a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
scenario where q changes exogenously at some point in time for a subset of the
homes in the dataset (Chay and Greenstone, 2005). This project assesses the
potential validity of many hedonic studies that have been undertaken using data
collected during the 1990s and 2000s. It also gives guidance for upcoming studies
during inevitable future housing booms and bubbles.
Theory
Theory of Bubbles
To model price bubbles in the housing market, I use what is known as the
concept of a rational bubble. This theory of bubble behavior is derived from
Evans (1991), Campbell et al. (1997) and Phillips and Yu (2011). This type of
bubble allows for explosive behavior in the price of an asset, but requires that
the explosive behavior is temporary. The advantage of this type of bubble model
is that it can reﬂect what we observe in the housing market, namely standard
asset appreciation, followed by explosive behavior for a period of time, and
then a collapse where the price reverts back roughly to its fundamental level.
The asymptotic theory of this type of bubble formation is developed in Phillips
and Magdalinos (2005) and has been shown to have the econometric properties
necessary for inference. In general, the real price of a generic ﬁnancial asset can be
separated into two terms, the market-fundamentals term, Ft, and a bubble term,
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Bt:
Pt = Ft +Bt (4.1)
where Ft =
∞∑
j=1
(1 + r)−jEtdt+j (4.2)
where dt represents the real dividend paid to the owner of the asset and r is the
interest rate. For the housing market, the dividend is the implicit rental price of
the home.
The bubble term is be a rational bubble if it satisﬁes
Bt = (1 + r)
−1EtBt+1 (4.3)
where Bt, the bubble component of the observed price, is a random variable. For
many applications, it is assumed that Bt = 0, and thus that Bt+j = 0 for all j. If
this is the case, then the price of the asset is always just Ft. For standard hedonic
property value models, this is the usual assumption.
The dividend paid to a property owner is the rental price of the property.
For a home that is occupied by the owner, the dividend is the opportunity cost
incurred by not renting the property to someone else and not having to rent a
diﬀerent home themselves. With no bubble,
Pi = Fi =
T∑
t=1
rentit
(1 + r)t
(4.4)
The implicit rental rate for the property ise determined simply by the value of the
land, the house and the usual local amenities. Estimation employs the regression
equation:
log(Pit) = xitβ + θqit + εit (4.5)
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When broadly deﬁned, there can be many types of bubbles. For housing
markets, the most relevant class of bubbles consists of those which are always
nonnegative and periodically collapse. We do not tend to observe housing prices
that fall below their fundamental value, except possibly under extremely rare
circumstances such as in select locations for a brief time in 2008. In general, we
observe bubbles that expand, and then suddenly collapse, correcting prices back to
their fundamental value.
One simple way to model a bubble is to use:
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Btut+1 (4.6)
where ut is an exogenous, strictly positive, and i.i.d. random variable with Etut =
1. The bubble grows at mean rate 1 + r indeﬁnitely. Equation (3) represents the
agents' forward-looking expectations. Agents are willing to purchase an asset in a
bubble as long as the bubble grows at the standard interest rate. Equation (6) is
the simplest way to generate a time series of a bubble that satisﬁes equation (3).
For this process, Bt will always be greater than zero. However, this bubble
will not collapse. It is unlikely that a bubble that does not collapse (after growing
to a high level) can exist in practice. A second condition can be added to the
model to allow for collapse, and also to allow for a period of explosive growth.
Assume that there is some threshold bubble size α, and that:
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Btut+1 if Bt ≤ α (4.7)
Bt+1 = [δ +
1
pi
(1 + r)θt+1(Bt − δ
1 + r
)]ut+1 if Bt > α (4.8)
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Intuitively, the bubble grows at the standard interest rate, (1 + r), for a
period of time. Equation (7) describes this phase of the bubble. Eventually, the
size of the bubble reaches the threshold level of α, and the bubble then enters an
explosive phase. During the explosive phase, the bubble grows at a markedly faster
rate, (1+r)pi−1. Equation (8) represents the explosive phase of the bubble. At each
period during the explosive phase, the bubble can collapse with probability 1 − pi.
The parameter θt+1 takes a value 0 if the bubble collapses and a value of 1 as long
as it does not. If the bubble collapses, Bt+1 returns to a mean value δ. As long as
δut+1 < α it evolves according to equation (7) and begin the process again (Evans,
1991).
This process is classiﬁed as a rational bubble because the increased returns
during the explosive phase are balanced by the chance of collapse, and equation
(3) is satisﬁed. When the bubble collapses, the bubble will revert to value δ, and
prices will return close to their fundamental level. As long as δ > 0, then Bt ≥ 0
for all t. As a consequence:
Pt = Ft +Bt ≥ Ft (4.9)
Hedonic Estimation in the Presence of a Bubble
Many economists have studied bubbles and their implications in asset prices.
However, there is no work, to my knowledge, that incorporates bubbles in a
housing market into a hedonic property value model. This section outlines some
things to expect when combining bubbles and hedonic property estimation.
In the absence of any bubble, Bt = 0, assume that a regression that would
give unbiased estimates of the marginal willingness to pay for a given amenity, θ,
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is:
Fit = α + xitβ + θqit + εit (4.10)
The true MWTP of the amenity is ∂Fit
∂q
= θ. When we observe data on property
sales, however, we observe Pit, when what we truly desire as the dependent
variable is fundamental home value, Fit.
To set up the bubble, we assume that Bit will be greater than or equal to
zero at all times, so there must exist some number ct ≥ 1 such that
Pit = ctFit (4.11)
where ct can be viewed as the proportion by which property prices are above their
fundamental value at any instant in time on average.2 The bubble is created by
dynamics that are additive in nature, as outlined in the previous section. This
multiplicative factor ct, is useful to consider for providing some insight into what
to expect from the regressions. When the bubble has expanded, ct will be high,
and if there is no bubble ct will equal 1. The general hedonic regression using
cross-sectional data is:
Fi = α + xiβ + θqi + εi (4.12)
The time subscripts have been dropped for clarity, so equation (12) represent data
collected for only a single time period. We cannot observe Fi, but can observe the
proxy Pi = ctFi, so we run the regression:
Pi = α
∗ + xiβ∗ + θ∗qi + ε∗i (4.13)
2Since ctFit = Fit +Bit, then ct ≡ 1 + BitFit .
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which is equivalent to:
ctFi = α
∗ + xiβ∗ + θ∗qi + ε∗i (4.14)
If we estimate equation (12) and equation (14), the coeﬃcients would be:
θ∗ = ctθ and β∗ = ctβ and α∗ = ctα and ε∗i = ctεi (4.15)
If we estimate a hedonic property model with data from a single time period
via simple OLS, we would expect to bias our estimates by whatever proportion the
home value is above its fundamental level at that given moment. We would expect
to see this bias in both the estimates for the marginal value of the public good
that is the target of the study, as well as the estimates of all the marginal values of
the usual housing characteristics. If we naively interpret ∂Pit
∂q
as the marginal price,
then we will overstate the true value by the factor ct.
More typically, the hedonic property value model is estimated using ln(Price)
as the dependent variable, to reduce the heteroscedasticity in the errors. Suppose
that the regression equation for crosssectional data that would give the true
parameters is:
ln(Fi) = α + xiβ + θqi + εi (4.16)
The marginal value for the amenity is still ∂Fi
∂q
= θ. Exponentiating both sides of
this equation and then taking the derivative of Fi with respect to qi yields:
Fi = e
α+xiβ+θqi+εi (4.17)
MWTP =
∂Fi
∂q
= θeα+xiβ+θqi+εi = θFi (4.18)
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But suppose we instead use the observed selling price in the regression, Pi = ctFi.
Taking the log of the selling price yields:
ln(Pi) = ln(ctFi) = ln(ct) + ln(Fi) (4.19)
Given that we have assumed ct ≥ 1, it should be the case that ln(ct) ≥ 0. If
we let ln(ct) = κt and consider the regression that uses Pi in place of Fi,
κt + ln(Fi) = ln(Pi) = α
∗ + xiβ∗ + θ∗qi + ε∗i (4.20)
the estimated coeﬃcients from equation (20) compared to the true estimates from
equation (16) are:
θ∗ = θ and β∗ = β and α∗ = κt + α (4.21)
it may seem that there is no bias with the regression in equation (20) since θ∗ = θ.
However, the ultimate goal of hedonic studies is to determine the MWTP of the
public for an environmental amenity. When we use Pi as a measure of property
value instead of Fi, equation (18) becomes
MWTP = θPi = θctFi (4.22)
If the model is estimated in semi-log form, the estimated MWTP is biased by the
same amount as when it is estimated in level form. We interpret these coeﬃcients
as percent diﬀerences in property price for a one-unit increase in qi. The same θ
coeﬃcient in a model with property sales inclusive of a bubble will be interpreted
as implying a larger marginal value. This yields the same bias, namely that the
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estimated MWTP for one unit of amenity qi is biased by a factor equal to the
proportion by which property prices lie above their fundamental levels.
I examine two speciﬁcations that are commonly used in hedonic property
value models, a border discontinuity model and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model.
We expect that the border discontinuity simulation exhibit the bias highlighted
here. It is less clear how the theory manifests itself in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
model that uses longitudinal or panel data.3 As the bubble expands or collapses
over time, ct is also changing with time. Monte Carlo simulation allows me to
estimate the impact of the bubble in a more complex model.
Data
The data for this analysis are generated using a modiﬁed version of the
algorithm presented in Kuminoﬀ and Jarrah (2010).4 Their algorithm takes an
equal number of households and homes as inputs, and as output, assigns each
household to exactly one property. Each household maximizes its utility over
preferences for the characteristics of the house, the presence of the public good,
and over their other consumption.
In Kuminoﬀ and Jarrah, each household i has utility for property j given by:
Uij = ln(yi − Pij) + αiln(xj) + λiln(qj) (4.23)
3One technique used to account for OVB is to only use resale data on properties that have
sold multiple times. Future work could check the performance of this model when one (or both)
of the transactions occur during a bubble.
4The central feature of this algorithm is that it will take a set of property prices and property
characteristics and calibrate the household preferences. After this calibration it can create a new
set of selling prices after a shock to the market, or for a new set of property characteristics.
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i.e. yi is the income of household i. Parameters αi and λi are the household-
speciﬁc preferences over the dwelling and lot characteristics and the public good,
respectively.
The algorithm conducts a second-price bidding auction to assign each
property to a buyer.5 Each household submits a bid for every property based
on their income and their preferences over property amenities. The household
with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the second-highest price for
the property. Kuminoﬀ and Jarrah show that the algorithm converges to an
equilibrium that assigns one household to one property.
The set of properties for this analysis come from property sales in the San
Francisco Bay area from 1993 to 2008. The characteristics of each property are
drawn from actual sales. The assignment of the level of the public good is done as
part of the simulation process, and will be described in more detail in the results
section. The selling price is modiﬁed by adding a bubble over time.
The ideal method to introduce the bubble would be to change the
households' expectations of the future selling price of the property. As the bubble
begins to form, households observe the increased returns, and are willing to
pay a higher portion of their income for property in anticipation of receiving a
higher selling price in the future. However, the algorithm as it stands requires
approximately one week to converge. Adding a value-function calculation for each
household at each step would increase the run-time beyond present computational
capacity. Instead, the algorithm determines the initial price with no bubble
5A second-price auction is used because the optimal strategy in the Nash Equilibrium is
for each individual to bid their valuation. In a ﬁrst-price auction, the optimal strategy for the
individual with the highest bid is to bid the second-highest individual's valuation + ε and not
their own valuation (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
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present, and then the bubble will be permitted to expand exogenously using
equations (7) and (8) from the theory section.
As above, the observed selling price is the sum of the fundamental
component and a bubble component:
Pt = Ft +Bt (4.24)
The algorithm above determines Ft. I then incorporate a second process that
changes the price over time by adding a bubble term. To do this, an initial value of
Bt must be assigned. The simplest choice would be to assign a constant number
that is the same for all properties. However, this would imply that low-cost
properties derive a larger proportion of their price from the bubble. Kuminoﬀ and
Pope (2013) show that observations of actual housing markets show similar overall
percentage growth across all segments of the housing market. As a consequence,
the initial value for the bubble is chosen as a ﬁxed percentage of the fundamental
price of the property. I use B0 = 0.05Ft for each property in the sample, with a
sensitivity analysis concerning this arbitrary setting.
Results
Border Discontinuity Model
One common method for conducting a hedonic property value study is to
collect cross-sectional data in a single housing market that spans a geographical
border between jurisdictions with diﬀerent amenity levels, and to use a border
discontinuity model to identify the value of the amenity. The border discontinuity
design allows the researcher to minimize OVB due to unobservable neighborhood
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characteristics. This model is commonly used to estimate the value of school
quality, e.g. (Black, 1999; Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, 2011; Kuminoﬀ and Pope,
2014). School districts cover relatively large areas, so simply comparing property
values in the higher-quality school district to those in the lower-quality school
district captures the value of the school system itself, but also capture other
features that are correlated with school quality. In general, higher-quality schools
tend to be in better neighborhoods. To correct for this problem, the border
discontinuity model compares only those homes that are close to the district
boundaries, where the changes in the other unobserved neighborhood features will
be small. For estimation, this requires either adding a set of dummy variables for
properties that are on the boundary (or adding a variable that measures distance
from the boundary), and a set of dummies for properties that are in the higher-
quality school district. The general regression equation in semi-log form is:
ln(Pi) = x
′
iβ + γBi + θ
RDDi + ηi + εi (4.25)
where the xi are the standard observable features of the property (including
an intercept), ηi is a set of county or neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects, Bi is the set
of dummies for all properties that are on either side of the boundary. Di is an
indicator variable that =1 if the property is located in the high-quality school
district (i.e. receives the public good) and Di = 0 elsewhere.
My simulation generates property price data for 20 years. The bubble is
assigned ten years of non-explosive growth (Eq 7), and then given 10 years of
explosive growth (Eq 8). Estimation is then undertaken using two separate cross
sections. The value of the public good is calculated in year 1, when the bubble
has just a small eﬀect. The implied value of public good is also calculated in year
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TABLE 14.
Percent bias in hedonic estimate of MWTP for public good with border discontinuity
model (means and standard deviation from 300 Monte Carlo replications)
pi = 0.65 pi = 0.75
Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log
Year 1 (No Bubble) 0.049 (0) -0.025 (0) -0.11 (0) -0.03 (0)
Year 15 0.34 (0.057) 0.24 (0.053) 0.09 (0.027) 0.20 (0.029)
Year 20 1.06 (0.56) 0.91 (0.53) 0.27 (0.013) 0.39 (0.014)
20, after the bubble has had time to go through its phase of explosive expansion.
Households' true preferences over the public good are positive, but do not change
with time. For the simulation B0 = δ = 0.05Ft, r = 0.01, ut ∼ logN(1, 0.005)
and pi is given two diﬀerent values of 0.65 and 0.75. Each simulation involves 300
replications.
With this type of bubble-generating process, some size of bubble is always
present. During the 10 years of non-explosive growth, the bubble is still present at
5% of the fundamental value. We can interpret this phase as the housing market
behaving normally with no bubble present. With this model for bubble behavior,
the initial value of the bubble must be large enough that when explosive growth
occurs, the bubble portion is a signiﬁcant contributor to the price. The values of
pi of 0.65 and 0.75 are used because, on average, (in year 20), the observed selling
price ise 100% and 50% above the fundamental price, respectively. Figure 2 shows
the time paths of the bubble that is generated, as well as the fundamental value of
the properties and the resulting prices.
The true property values to which naive estimates are compared, are given
by the results of the ﬁrst-stage simulation. For the linear speciﬁcation, this is ∂F
∂q
=
θ, where F is the output from the ﬁrst stage of the simulation, and for the semi-log
93
speciﬁcation, this is θFit. The true values of θ and θFit are compared in Table 14
to the naively estimated values of parameters θ̂ and θ̂Pit.
(a) pi = 0.65 (b) Bubble Portion
(c) pi = 0.75 (d) Bubble Portion
FIGURE 20.
Prices, Fundamental Value, and Bubble Portion for Example Simulation
In the ﬁrst year, the naive estimates show minimal bias, with the semi-log
speciﬁcation performing better than the linear speciﬁcation. This conﬁrms prior
Monte Carlo results (Cropper et al., 1988; Kuminoﬀ et al., 2010).
The bias in the naive estimates of the key coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant in
the estimates based on data in years 15 and 20 when the housing market is in
the midst of an explosive bubble. These results are dependent on the size of
the bubble compared to fundamental value at the time transaction prices are
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measured. As the bubble expands, housing prices move farther away from their
fundamental values. The bias from year 15 is smaller than the bias in year 20
when the bubble has expanded further. For pi = 0.65, property prices are, on
average, 100% above their fundamental values at the end of year 20. The bias
recovered is similar to this value. The results are analogous for pi = 0.75. The
bubble does not expand as quickly with the higher value for pi, but the bias in the
naive estimates is near to the proportional diﬀerence between the fundamental
value and the observed price. If the bubble collapses and prices return to their
fundamental values, then the bias will no longer be present.
Due to the nature of the cross-sectional data used in the border discontinuity
model, when the usual hedonic property value model is used for applied empirical
studies, the available data cannot tell us whether the housing market is in
a bubble. If a researcher wishes to correct for the presence of a bubble, it is
necessary to look at a time series of aggregated data for that housing market, and
to test for the presence of the bubble using the methods outlined in Phillips and
Yu (2011). After determining the timing and size of the bubble, then the prices
could be deﬂated by the estimated amount to recover the fundamental property
values.
Quasi-experimental Model
The second simulation uses a naive generalized diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
model to estimate the value of a change in the public good. This section follows
the standard assumptions of a quasi-experiment. There is a treatment group that
receives a plausibly exogenous change in the public good at some time t, while the
control group experiences no change in the public good.
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This regression uses the equation:
lnPit = x
′
itβ + γ1Dit + γ2Tit + θ
DD × Tit × Sit + ηi + εit (4.26)
i.e. where Dit is an indicator variable for the properties that receive the public
good, Tit is a time indicator for the sale occurring after the treatment, and the ηi
are county or home ﬁxed eﬀects. For the model with time ﬁxed eﬀects, the post-
treatment dummy is replaced with a set of time ﬁxed eﬀects and the regression
equation becomes:
lnPit = x
′
itβ + γ1Dit + θ
DD × Tit ×Dit + µt + ηi + εit (4.27)
For this exercise, the bubble is simulated analogously to the previous section,
where the bubble exhibits a non-explosive phase for 10 years, and then an
explosive phase for 10 years. The simulation parameters are also the same,
B0 = δ = 0.05Ft, r = 0.01, ut ∼ logN(1, 0.005), and pi = 0.75 and pi = 0.65.
This simulation gives insight into the bias that may be present if naive hedonic
property value methods are employed with data from the 1990s and 2000s up until
2006 (i.e. prior to the crash of the housing market). The value of q changes from 0
to 1 for the treatment group in year 15.
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TABLE 15.
Percent bias in hedonic estimate of MWTP for public good with border discontinuity model
(means and standard deviation from 300 Monte Carlo replications)
pi = 0.65 pi = 0.75
Linear Semi-log Linear Semi-log
Diﬀerence in diﬀerence 0.22 (0.29) 0.50 (0.022) 0.0627 (0.22) 0.223 (0.010)
Diﬀerence in diﬀerence
with time ﬁxed eﬀects
0.17 (0.28) 0.46 (0.017) 0.0428 (0.21) 0.204 (0.008)
Diﬀerence in diﬀerence
with house ﬁxed eﬀects
0.18 (0.37) 0.48 (0.018) 0.0435 (0.22) 0.208 (0.009)
The results in Table 15 show that the use of quasi-experimental methods
does not completely remove the bias caused by the bubble. Comparing the extent
of the bias reported in Table 2 to the bias reported in the previous section, note
that the bias is about one-third as large for the linear speciﬁcation, and half as
large for the semi-log speciﬁcation, compared to the border discontinuity model.
The estimates are very similar regardless of whether home ﬁxed eﬀects are used
and a resale only model is used such as that in Bajari et al. (2012). The resale
only model corrects for endogeneity in the home price that is due to unobservable
attributes of the home or neighborhood, but it is unable to correct for a bubble
that aﬀects the entire housing market. Comparing the two model speciﬁcations,
the linear speciﬁcation does not display as large a bias, but the linear model
estimates are noisier than those from the semi-log speciﬁcation.
Future Research
There are several directions in which further analysis could proceed. The
ﬁrst issue is that this research demonstrates how bubbles in the housing market
can cause bias in the estimates of MWTP for environmental amenities or other
public goods. However, the analysis does not yet oﬀer a clear solution or a new
best practice for how to correct this problem so as to obtain unbiased estimates
from observational data.
One signiﬁcant hurdle to obtaining unbiased estimates is that there is no
direct way to measure the fundamental price of housing. There may be other
variables that can be included in the dataset that could carry information on the
size of the bubble. Additional research could undertake to determine whether data
from a diﬀerent housing market, not in a bubble, or some other variable(s) could
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be used to instrument for (or be included in) the regression to reduce or remove
the bias.
Another potential source of insight for hedonic property value models is to
apply some of the techniques developed by researchers studying bubble formation
and evolution in ﬁnancial markets. It is standard practice in the hedonic property
model to deﬂate prices by CPI to obtain real property prices rather than nominal
prices. It may be possible to construct an index representing the strength of the
bubble at each point in time. Deﬂating prices with this index could give a better
measure of fundamental prices to use as the dependent variable. A problem with
this potential solution is that the housing bubble of the 2000s was heterogeneous
across diﬀerent locations. Further research is thus needed to determine if the
measurement error from estimating the index in a single market would outweigh
the gains of such an index.
Finally, it may be possible to create a dynamic price simulator where the
bubble is produced endogenously. Branch and Evans (2011) have shown that
agents using least squares learning can create asset-pricing bubbles that ﬁrst
grow and then collapse. Using such a model might make it possible to produce
a time-series of housing prices in one step, instead of having to rely on the two-
step simulator used in this paper. A Branch-Evans type of model could also be
calibrated to actual data. Using a structural model, it may be possible to estimate
what proportion of the observed price changes are due to bubbles and what
proportion are due to changes in preferences or technology. Using this approach,
it may be possible to reestimate the total and marginal WTP for properties and
their amenities obtained from papers that have been produced using data across
time periods that overlapped with the recent housing price bubble.
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Conclusion
This paper conducts a Monte Carlo study to determine the extent of the
bias of the key parameters of a naive hedonic property value model caused by the
presence of a bubble in the housing market. I leverage the ability of a Monte Carlo
study to hold the fundamental hedonic price function constant, and control for all
other omitted variables while prices experience an explosive bubble.
The results show that the presence of a bubble does bias the estimates for
the MWTP for public goods obtained via a naive hedonic regression, and that
the size of the bias is proportional to the magnitude of the bubble. The two
most common techniques for removing typical omitted variable biasesborder
discontinuity models, and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences modelsdo not fully correct
for the bias, although the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model appears to produce less
biased estimates than the border discontinuity model.
These results suggest that researchers should consider the presence of
bubbles in the housing market, particularly when conducting hedonic studies that
use data from the 2000s. Previous studies have shown that ignoring changes in
preferences, income or information can bias estimates of MWTP for environmental
amenities (Kuminoﬀ et al., 2010; Boyle et al., 2012). The research described in
this paper shows that we should also consider changes to the housing market
that are based on bubble behavior. If we erroneously interpret bubble behavior
as fundamental changes in housing preferences, we will come to misleading
conclusions when evaluating environmental amenities. If these estimates are used
for policy, the exaggeration of the value of some environmental amenities could
lead to suboptimal policy choices. Future work is necessary to determine the best
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FIGURE 21.
Comparison for diﬀerent bubble parameters
modeling techniques to correct for bubble-induced biases in hedonic property value
models.
Appendix A: Sensitivity Analysis
This section examines the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
parameters that create the bubble dynamics. In the paper, the parameters chosen
were δ = B0 = 0.05Fi and two diﬀerent values for pi, 0.65 and 0.75 for the
explosive phase of the bubble. This section examines the eﬀects of changing these
parameters.
Changing only one parameter will create changes in the bubble dynamics.
Lowering pi makes the bubble more explosive, and lowering δ = B0 would lower the
bubble across the whole time series. To create a bubble with similar dynamics as
those used in the paper, the two parameters δ and pi can to be changed in tandem.
Figure 21 shows an example plot for three diﬀerent scenarios that produce a
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TABLE 16.
Percent bias in hedonic estimate of MWTP for public good with border discontinuity
model for diﬀerent model parameters
pi = 0.65, B0 = 0.05Ft pi = 0.615, B0 = 0.03Ft pi = 0.680, B0 = 0.07Ft
Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log Linear Semi-Log
Year 1 (No Bubble) 0.049 (0) -0.025 (0) 0.049 (0) -0.025 (0) 0.049 (0) -0.025 (0)
Year 15 0.34 (0.057) 0.24 (0.053) 0.33 (0.048) 0.23 (0.042) 0.29 (0.058) 0.22 (0.055)
Year 20 1.06 (0.56) 0.91 (0.53) 1.19 (0.61) 0.99 (0.54) 0.94 (0.44) 0.89 (0.47)
bubble similar to pi = 0.65 and B0 = 0.05Ft. If the simulation were to be
extended across more time periods, a bubble with a higher value of pi (and lower δ)
would expand faster and overtake the other bubbles. These value show reasonable
similarity for the 20 years that are considered. There is a trade-oﬀ in deciding
values for the parameters. Lower values of δ allow for property values that are
closer to the fundamental value when the bubble is not in its explosive phase.
However, these lower values for δ require a smaller value of pi to generate the same
size bubble. Smaller values of pi create more explosive growth rates during the
explosive phase, and there are practical considerations regarding how fast a bubble
could expand in practice.
The results in Table 16 show that changing the parameter values creates
some minor changes to the magnitude of the recovered estimates. Small diﬀerences
are expected as changing the parameters does cause small changes in the dynamics
of the bubble. However, the central theme of the results is still the same: we do
not see the results vanish, or any changes in signs of the coeﬃcients.
102
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines how drought and water shortages inﬂuence
society and also studies the validity the hedonic property value model when there
is a bubble present in the housing market. Chapter II focuses on how drought
inﬂuences crime in the context of South Africa, a middle-income country. Chapter
III focuses on how drought inﬂuences migration within the United States, and
Chaper IV examines how estimating hedonic property value estimates of the
MWTP for environmental amenities may be biased when there is a bubble present
in the housing market.
The analysis described in these three chapters can help to advise policy
makers who are considering public policy that aﬀects water planning and
conservation, or any analysis that uses the hedonic property value model to
estimate the value of an environmental amenity or disamenity. The research
documented here can also be used as part of an analysis of climate change
policy, where the potential costs due to water shortages and drought can be fully
considered.
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